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An Appraisal of the Louisiana
Law of Partnership:
A COMPARATIVE FOCUS ON SOURCE MATERIALS AND
UNDERLYING PRACTICES
(PART II)t
F. HODGE O'NEAL*
ENTITY AND AGGREGATE THEORIES: EFFECT ON
UNDERLYING PRACTICES
Anglo-American scholars have debated vigorously the re-
spective merits of the entity and aggregate theories of the nature
of the partnership-whether a conception of the partnership as
a legal entity (separate and apart from the individuals compos-
ing it) or as an aggregate of individuals (having in law no ex-
istence apart from its members) is more useful to an under-
standing of partnership practices or more conducive to the proper
development of partnership law.1 This article does not rehash
the old arguments. Instead it (1) traces the development of the
aggregate and entity theories and (2) inquires as to what extent
doctrinal and conceptual differences as to the nature of the part-
nership have affected underlying partnership practices. Particu-
lar emphasis is placed on whether partnership practices in Lou-
isiana, as a consequence of an entity concept adopted from French
law and phrased in the language of the French commentators,
differ materially from partnership practices in the aggregate or
other entity jurisdictions. In short, the inquiry in this chapter is:
Are doctrinal and conceptual differences as to the juridical
nature of the partnership at present largely verbal? Or are those
differences reflected in diversified practices?
Traditionally the common law treated the partnership as an
t This is the second installment of the article. The first installment ap-
pears in (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 307.
* Dean, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University.
1. That the partnership should be considered an entity: Crane, The Uni-
form Partnership Act-A Criticism (1915) 28 Harv. L. Rev. 762; Judge
Learned Hand in In Re Samuels & Lesser, 207 Fed. 195, 198 (S.D. N.Y. 1913).
That the partnership should be considered an aggregate: Lewis, The Uniform
Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism (1915) 29 Harv. L. Rev.
158; Warren, Corporate Advantages Without Incorporation (1929) 2, 17, 29-
140.
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aggregate of individuals.2 In most respects, the firm was con-
sidered nothing more than an "abbreviation," occasionally useful
to avoid the vexatious enumeration of the names of the individual
members. Closely associated with the aggregate concept was the
proposition, early laid down by the common law courts,3 that
partners were co-owners of partnership property holding as joint
tenants. The law relating to the rights of partners and separate
creditors in partnership property became hopelessly confused 4
because of the great variety of devices used by the courts in an
effort to avoid applying certain incidents of joint tenancy to the
partnership.
Businessmen and accountants long had regarded the partner-
ship as a business unit which moves forward to success or failure
as an entity separate from the individuals who compose it. This
mercantile idea as to the nature of the partnership seemed to
offer an escape from the confusion which existed under the ag-
gregate theory and from the undesirable consequences of the
common law rule that partners are co-owners of partnership
property holding as joint tenants. Many courts in the United
States, in some instances aided by legislation, soon gave the part-
nership, for certain purposes at least, a legal existence in keeping
with the mercantile view.5
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws drew several tentative drafts of the Uniform Partnership
Act on the entity theory. Finally, however, a draft avowedly
based on the aggregate theory was accepted by the commission-
ers.6 In spite of this seeming triumph of the aggregate theory, the
controversy between the exponents of the two theories continues.7
Many courts, including some in jurisdictions which have enacted
the Uniform Act,8 still treat the partnership as an entity and
2. This is admitted even by the chief advocate of the entity view. Crane,
Handbook of the Law of Partnership (1938) 8-12, § 3.
3. Heydon v. Heydon, 1 Salk. 392 (1693).
4. Lewis, supra note 1, at 162-163.
5. Drucker v. Wellhouse, 82 Ga. 129, 8 S.E. 40, 41 (1888); Rosenbaum v.
Hayden, 22 Neb. 744, 36 N.W. 147 (1888); Note (1938) 25 Va. L. Rev. 104, 105.
6. Lewis, supra note 1, at 171-172.
7. Comparatively recent decisions expounding the aggregate view include
Jung v. Bowles, 152 F.(2d) 726 (C.C.A. 9th, 1946); United States v. Posner,
3 F. Supp. 252 (S.D. N.Y. 1933); Fidelity Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Howard,
182 Miss. 546, 181 So. 846 (1938); Williams v. Hartshorn, 296 N.Y. 49, 69 N.E.
(2d) 557 (1946); In re Morrison's Estate, 343 Pa. 157, 22 A.(2d) 729 (1941).
8. Keegan v. Keegan, 194 Minn. 261, 260 N.W. 318 (1935); Note (1938) 25
Va. L. Rev. 104, 105.
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voice approval of the entity view.9 In fact, there is considerable
evidence of a growing trend to adopt that view.10
Most civil law jurisdictions treat the partnership as an entity
with legal relations separate and distinct from those of its in-
dividual members.'1 The impression conveyed by many American
texts, 2 however, that all civil law jurisdictions always have con-
sidered all types of partnerships as entities for all purposes is not
accurate. In Roman law the partnership was not recognized as
a legal person;' 3 and even now many civil law jurisdictions treat
the partnership as a legal person only for limited purposes.' 4 And
French law has not been entirely free from controversy. It is true
that since the enactment of the Code Napoleon the French com-
mentators and courts have been in agreement that the commer-
cial partnership is a juridical person 15 possessed of rights and
privileges and subject to obligations distinct from those of the
human beings composing it; that it is the owner of partnership
property; that it, through the medium of its managers, contracts
with third persons; and that it becomes creditor or debtor. But
9. Lobato v. Paulino, 304 Mich. 668, 8 N.W.(2d) 873 (1943); White v. Tulsa
Iron & Metal Corp., 185 Okla. 606, 95 P.(2d) 590 (1939); Chitwood v. McMil-
lan, 189 S.C. 262, 1 S.E. (2d) 162 (1939); Dunbar v. Farnum, 109 Vt. 313, 321,
196 Atl. 237, 240 (1938).
10. Dunbar v. Farnum, 109 Vt. 313, 196 Atl. 237, 240 (1938); 40 Am, Jur.
(Partnership) § 18.
11. 1 Rowley, The Modern Law of Partnership (1916) 127-128, § 122;
Brinson v. Monroe Automobile and Supply Co., 180 La. 1064, 1076, 158 So.
558, 562 (1934); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 55 Cal. App.(2d) 720,
132 P.(2d) 70, 76 (1942). The partnership is treated as a judicial person in
Belgium, Chile, Mexico, Russia, and Scotland. This widespread recognition
of the legal. personality of the partnership has been said to be strong evi-
dence of the inherent merit of the entity concept. Crane, supra note 1, at
764-765.
12. Burdick, Law of Partnership (3 ed. 1917) 82-83; Gilmore, Handbook on
the Law of Partnership (1911) 117, § 40.
13. Crane, supra note 1, at 763; 1 Rowley, op. cit. supra note 11, at 127,
§ 122. Further, the doctrine of mutual agency as it is understood in Anglo-
American law of partnership was unknown to the Roman law. Huebner, A
History of Germanic Private Law: The Continental Legal History Series
(1918) 159, § 23.
14. The partnership is an entity only as respects third persons in Italy,
Roumania, and Portugal. Crane, supra note 1, at 765. With respect to the
mercantile partnership of German law, see Huebner, op. cit. supra note 13,
at 159, § 23: "The ordinary merchantile partnership of the private law of
today constitutes, like the old community of collective hand, an entity in
which are bound together the individual associates, and which, without
actually possessing independent legal personality, has the appearance, par-
ticularly in relations with third parties, of a solidary and self-sufficient body.
It can have its own social property, which, as a separate estate distinct from
the private estates of the partners, belongs to these in collective hand. Simi-
larly, partnership obligations are possible that are not at the same time pri-
vate debts of the members, and for which these are liable in collective hand."
15. 23 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Wahl, Traitd Th6orique et Pratique de
Droit Civil, de la Socift6, du Pr~t, du D~pot (3 ed. 1907) 8, n 0 11; 11 Huc,
Commentaire Th6orique & Pratique du Code Civil (1898) 33, n 23.
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whether the ordinary civil partnership of French law is an entity
is a question beset with some difficulty. ' The commentators have
always expressed the opinion that the redactors of the Code
Napoleon did not consider such partnerships juridical persons.'7
Formerly this view was followed by the courts. The Court of
Cassation, however, since 1890, has handed down a number of
decisions in which ordinary civil partnerships were treated as
entities. 8
Louisiana courts have shown remarkable unanimity in their
comments on the nature of the partnership. They might have
been expected to encounter considerable difficulty in maintaining
a consistent theory. Louisiana partnership law (including com-
mercial partnership law, since a commercial code was never
adopted) ' 9 supposedly is grounded on the articles of the Louisi-
ana Civil Code.20 Those articles do not correspond to provisions
in the French commercial code pursuant to which the French
commercial partnership uniformly has been treated as a legal
person. The Louisiana codal provisions correspond rather to the
articles of the Code Napoleon relating to the ordinary civil part-
nership, the juridical nature of which is in dispute in France.
Further, in view of the tendency of Louisiana courts in most
phases of partnership law to import Anglo-American concepts,
it would not have been surprising to find the Louisiana courts at
times borrowing entity ideas and on other occasions adopting
aggregate theories. Such has not been the fact. Louisiana courts
consistently have asserted that both the commercial partnership
and the ordinary partnership are legal persons.21
Louisiana courts unquestionably obtained their theory and
the language in which it is expressed from the French commen-
tators. In 1844, in Dick v. Byrne,22 a case involving the question
whether compensation 23 takes place by operation of law between
a debt due by a commercial firm and one due to one of its mem-
16. 23 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Wahl, loc. cit. supra note 15; 11 Huc, loc.
cit. supra note 15.
17. 23 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Wahl, op. cit. supra note 15, at 8-9, no 11.
Cf. 11 Hue, op. cit. supra note 15, at 34-35, n0 24.
18. Cass. 23 f~v. 1891, D.91.1.337; Cass. 2 mars. 1892, S.92.1.497, D.93.1.169;
Cass. 22 f~v. 1898, D.99.1.593. See also Crane, supra note 1, at 764.
19. See p. 324, supra.
20. Arts. 2801-2890, La. Civil Code of 1870.
21. See authorities cited notes 27, 28, and 29 infra.
22. 7 Rob. 465 (La. 1844). Cf. Blanchard v. Cole, 8 La. 153 (1835), on ap-
plication for rehearing 8 La. 160 (1835).
23. "When two persons are indebted to each other, there takes place be-
tween them a compensation that extinguishes both the debts .. " Art. 2207,
La. Civil Code of 1870. See also Art. 2208, La. Civil Code of 1870; Stewart v.
Harper, 16 La. Ann. 181 (1861).
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bers, a Louisiana court apparently for the first time inquired into
the legal nature of the partnership. In that case the court adopted
the view of Toullier, that a commercial partnership is "an arti-
ficial being, distinct from the persons of which it is composed, ' 24
on the ground that his view was "more consonant to the positive
enactment" of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825. The court did
not specify what provisions of that code led them to accept the
views of Toullier; nor did the court mention that Louisiana had
no legislation corresponding to those provisions of the French
Commercial Code relating to the commercial partnership.
In Smith v. McMicken,25 decided in 1848, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court again discussed the nature of the partnership. The
partnership involved in that case also was a commercial one, but
the language used by the court was not limited in its application
to commercial partnerships. Citing Troplong as authority, the
court stated:
"The partnership once formed and put into action, becomes,
in contemplation of law, a moral being, distinct from persons
who compose it. It is a civil person, which has its peculiar
rights and attributes. '26
This language has been quoted totidem verbis in numerous Lou-
isiana cases 27 in the century which has elapsed since Smith v.
McMicken.
Although most Louisiana cases containing statements that a
partnership is an entity have involved commercial partnerships, 2
24. 7 Rob. 465, 467 (La. 1844).
25. 3 La. Ann. 319 (1848).
26. Id. at 322.
27. Succession of Pilcher, 39 La. Ann. 362, 365, 1 So. 929, 932 (1887); Brin-
son v. Monroe Automotive & Supply Co., 180 La. 1064, 158 So. 558, 562 (1934).
See also First Nat. Bank of Shreveport v. Davis, 147 So. 93, 95 (La. App.
1933).
28. "The partnership is distinct from the individuals forming it." Christen
v. Ruhlman, 22 La. Ann. 570, 572 (1870). The "component parts of a firm are
distinct beings from the firm, as well as from each other, and their rights
and liabilities must be tested and adjudicated accordingly." Paradise & Bro.
v. Gerson, 32 La. Ann. 532, 534 (1880). "The partnership was a distinct per-
sonality from the individuals who compose it." Stothard v. William T. Hardie
& Co., 110 La. 696, 701, 34 So. 740, 742 (190,3). A partnership is "a legal entity
entirely separate and distinct from the persons who compose it, and may
have its own creditors and debtors to the same extent as the individual part-
.ners." E. B. Hayes Machinery Co. v. Eastham, 147 La. 347, 352, 84 So. 898, 899
(1920). See also Donohoe Oil & Gas Co. v. Mack-Jourden Co., 144 So. 169, 172
(La. App. 1932). The "mere termination of a partnership does not have the
effect, ipso facto, of extinguishing the concern as a legal entity. It remains
as such for the purpose of liquidation and until its affairs are completely
wound up." Duvic v. Home Finance Service, 23 So.(2d) 790, 794 (La. App.
1945).
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no doubt can exist that Louisiana courts also regard the ordinary
partnership as an entity.29 As early as 1887, in Succession of
Pilcher,30 the Supreme Court of Louisiana definitely committed
itself to the view that even the ordinary partnership is an entity.
That the ordinary partnership might differ in nature from the
commercial partnership apparently did not occur to the court.
The discord among French authorities as to the nature of the
ordinary partnership evidently has never been brought to the
attention of Louisiana courts.
In a few cases Louisiana courts have departed from the view
that a partnership is an entity. One of these departures was made
by the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1898 in Drews v. Williams.31
In that case Gus Drews and William Drews had agreed that the
former would remove logs from certain land and that the latter
would operate a mill and saw the logs into timber. Defendant,
who claimed the land, obtained an injunction forbidding Gus
Drews or his employees to trespass on it. The firm composed of
Gus Drews and William Drews sued to recover damages caused
the firm by the injunction. Defendant filed an exception of no
cause of action on the ground that the partnership was a different
person in law from Gus Drews, defendant in the injunction, and
that the injunction did not enjoin the partnership. The court
held that the injunction addressed to one of the partners had
the effect of enjoining the partnership and therefore that the
firm, if damaged, had a cause of action. Justice Breaux stated
that the court did not feel "that always, and in every case, the
firm is a legal entity, separate and distinct from its members.' '8 2
In addition he quoted with approval an excerpt from Lindley on
Partnership,33 expounding the common law aggregate theory.
The year after Drews v. Williams, the Court of Appeal of
the Parish of Orleans abandoned the entity theory and resorted
to the aggregate view to decide Davenport v. William Adler &
Co.34 In that case plaintiff had obtained in the district court a
judgment in solido against a partnership and the individual mem-
29. Succession of Pilcher, 39 La. Ann. 362, 1 So. 929 (1887); Donohoe Oil
& Gas Co. v. Mack-Jourden Co., 144 So. 169 (La. App. 1932). Cf. Toelke v.
Toelke, 153 La. 697, 96 So. 536 (1923). The cases which have considered the
nature of the. commercial partnership also usually have used language broad
enough to include all kinds of partnerships.
30. 39 La. Ann. 362, 1 So. 929 (1887).
31. 50 La. Ann. 579, 23 So. 897 (1898). Cf. Cucullu v. Manzanal, 4 Mart.
(N.S.) 183 (La. 1826).
32. 50 La. Ann. 579, 583-584, 23 So. 897, 899.
33. Ibid.
34. 129 So. 382 (La. App. 1899).
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bers. The firm, but not the individual members, applied for and
obtained a suspensive appeal. The court of appeal held that an
appeal by the firm brings up appeals for the individual partners
who are condemned as an incident to or by reason of firm mem-
bership. Again the court quoted with approval an excerpt from
Lindley on Partnership, advancing the aggregate theory;3 5 and
the court left no doubt that its holding was based on the ground
that a partnership is merely an aggregation of the individual
members. 36
A comparative analysis of Louisiana and Anglo-American
decisions indicates that the entity concept which Louisiana courts
have adopted from the French commentators has not resulted
in partnership law basically different from that of other states,
even from that of aggregate jurisdictions. Most of the corollary
principles which the Louisiana courts purport to deduce from
the entity theory reflect themselves in underlying practices sub-
stantially the same as practices in Anglo-American jurisdictions.
One of the most important corollaries which the Louisiana
courts deduce from the entity theory is that partnership property
-both movable and immovable 37-is owned by the firm, not by
the partners.38 They state that "the ideal being recognized by a
fiction of law" is the owner, that it has the right to control and
administer its property in order to fulfill its legal obligations,
and that the partners own only the residuum of partnership
property after firm obligations are discharged.3 9 Yet the Louisi-
ana courts' conception of a partner's interest in partnership prop-
erty actually is not essentially different from that of most Anglo-
American courts. As early as 1827, in Purdy v. Hood,40 the Su-
preme Court of Louisiana noted the similarity.41
In Anglo-American jurisdictions, although partners are oc-
casionally referred to as joint tenants or tenants in common, it
35. Id. at 383.
36. See also Dezendorf v. National Casualty Co., 171 So. 160 (La. App.
1936), discussed p. 466, infra.
37. The distinction drawn in Louisiana between "movable" and "immov-
able" property is roughly the same as the distinction made in common law
jurisdictions between personalty and realty.
38. Succession of Pilcher, 39 La. Ann. 362, 1 So. 929, 932 (1887); Toelke v.
Toelke, 153 La. 697, 96 So. 536 (1923); Posner v. Little Pine Lumber Co., 157
La. 73, 102 So. 16 (1924). Cf. Art. 2823, La. Civil Code of 1870.
39. Ibid.
40. 5 Mart. (N.S.) 626 (La. 1827).
41. "The owners of property held in partnership, have not separately a
particular interest in distinct portions of the common stock, but possess it
each as proprietor of his undivided portion, and of the whole; or, as expressed
by writers on the common law of England, in ancient Norman dialect, each
partner is possessed per my et per tout." 5 Mart. (N.S.) 626, 630.
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has long been settled that the partner's interest in firm assets is
not a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common.42 Like the Louisiana
courts, many Anglo-American courts assert that the individual
partners have no several rights in partnership property, even in
real estate; that they own the residue remaining after the settle-
ment of partnership accounts and the payment of firm obliga-
tions. 43 When Anglo-American courts state that neither partner
owns firm assets as such but only his share in the residue after
all firm debts are discharged, that is exactly what Louisiana
courts mean when they say that ownership is in the firm, a "fic-
titous moral being." The Uniform Partnership Act seems to adopt
the same view of the partner's interest in firm property by re-
ferring to the partner as holding "as a tenant in partnership '44
and declaring that a "partner's interest in the partnership is his
share of the profits and surplus. '45
If attention is focused on the rights and powers which a
partner has in partnership property rather than on the verbal
variations used to describe his interest, it becomes apparent that
both in Louisiana and in other jurisdictions a partner's owner-
ship of firm property is subject to the same basic limitation: the
property must be applied to partnership purposes before it can
be applied to purposes not connected with the mutual enterprise.46
In Louisiana, since partnership property is owned by the
partnership entity, a partner cannot give a mortgage on specific
firm property. In Harrington v. Harrington47 A sued B, his part-
ner in a cotton ginning business, for a dissolution of the firm and
sequestered all firm property. After the property had been seized
under the writ of sequestration, B gave a bank a mortgage to a
one-half undivided interest in firm real property. A obtained
judgment and the firm property was adjudicated to him. On the
day of the sale the bank intervened and asked that part of the
proceeds be set aside to pay its claim. The court rejected the de-
mands of the bank; it held that since B had only an unliquidated
42. Cowles, The Firm as a Legal Person (1903) 57 Central L.J. 343, 348;
and authorities cited note 43 infra.
43. Clay v. Freeman, 118 U.S. 97, 6 S.Ct. 964 (1886); Paige v. Paige, 71
Iowa 318, 32 N.W. 360 (1887); Sherley v. Thomasson's Ex'r, 8 Ky. L. Rep.
351, 1 S.W. 530 (1886); Mechem, Elements of the Law of Partnership (2 ed.
1920) 125-126, § 143.
44. U.P.A. § 25(1).
45. U.P.A. § 26.
46. Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criti-
cism (1915) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 158, 182(n); U.P.A. § 25(2). "And each partner
has the privilege to possess, use and dispose of partnership property, but only
for purposes of firm business." Note (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 436, 437.
47. 151 So. 648 (La. App. 1934).
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interest in an unliquidated partnership, the mortgage did not at-
tach to specific pieces of partnership property.48 Similarly, Anglo-
American courts generally hold that a mortgage purportedly on a
partner's interest in firm property does not vest the mortgagee
with a lien on specific firm property.49 Although the mortgage
often is made effective on the partner's interest in the partner-
ship,5 0 the rights of the mortgagee are inferior to the rights of
partnership creditors and to those of the other partners.51
That a partner's individual creditor cannot attach a particu-
lar partnership asset or the debtor partner's interest in a par-
ticular asset,5 2 is another important rule which Louisiana courts
deduce from the entity nature of the partnership and the owner-
ship of firm property by the entity. An individual creditor must
seize the debtor partner's whole share or interest in the partner-
ship.5 3
The Civil Code of 1825 was ambiguous as to the rights of
separate creditors. Article 2794 (which, incidentally, has been
carried over into the present code) 4 provided:
"The partnership property is liable to the creditors of the
partnership, in preference to those of the individual partner;
but the share of any partner may, in due course of law, be
seized and sold to satisfy his individual creditors, subject to
the debts of the partnership; 55 but such seizure, if legal, op-
erates as a dissolution of the partnership."
Whether the redactors of the Code of 1825 meant that a separate
creditor could seize the share of the debtor in specific partnership
48. Likewise, in Louisiana the sale by one partner of his interest in an
unliquidated partnership is not a sale of specific property or of any interest
in specific property; and therefore a vendor's lien is not created by such a
transaction. Posner v. Little Pine Lumber Co., 157 La. 73, 102 So. 16 (1924).
49. Harvey v. Stephens, 159 Mo. 486, 60 S.W. 1055 (1901); Tarbell v. West,
86 N.Y. 280 (1881).
50. Johnson v. Shirley, 152 Ind. 453, 53 N.E. 459 (1899); Schwanz v. Farm-
ers Co-op. Co., 204 Iowa 1273, 214 N.W. 491 (1927); Patterson v. Atkinson, 20
R.I. 102, 37 At!. 532 (1897).
51. Note (1935) 19 Minn. L. Rev. 252; and authorities cited note 50, supra.
52. Smith v. McMicken, 3 La. Ann. 319 (1848); Levy & Sugar v. Cowan &
Mayo and Mayo & Hodge, 27 La. Ann. 556 (1875); City of New Orleans v.
Gauthreaux, 32 La. Ann. 1126 (1880). Cf. Toelke v. Toelke, 153 La. 697, 96
So. 536 (1923).
53. B. W. Marston & Co. v. Dewberry, 21 La. Ann. 518 (1869); Levy &
Sugar v. Cowan & Mayo and Mayo & Hodge, 27 La. Ann. 556 (1875).
54. Art. 2823, La. Civil Code of 1870.
55. An error was made in translating the French text of this article into
English; "debts of the partnership" should be "privilege of the creditors of
the partnership on this property." 3 Louisiana Legal Archives, Compiled
Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisiana (1942) 1541.
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property or merely his interest in the firm is difficult to deter-
mine. The Code Napoleon does not contain an article which cor-
responds to Article 2794 of the Code of 1825.56
Even before the Louisiana courts gave verbal acceptance to
the view that the partnership is an entity, they announced in
several cases a rule that partnership property does not belong
to the partners but is "a common stock and pledge for the pay-
ment of the debts of the firm" in preference to claims against the
partners individually.57 Apparently these cases were litigated a
number of years before the Louisiana courts had given considera-
tion to the juridical nature of the partnership and adopted the
entity theory.58 In 1848, in Smith v. McMicken,5 9 however, the
Louisiana Supreme Court grounded its decision on the entity
theory. The court reasoned that, the partnership being a legal
person distinct from its component members, an individual credi-
tor cannot seize a particular asset of the partnership; that he must
.... await the liquidation of the partnership, and, in the
meanwhile, lay hold of the residuary interest of the partner
in the partnership generally, by levying a seizure in the hands
of the partnership, or the person charged with its liquidation
and representing it."' O
The court felt the procedure it required the separate creditor to
follow was in accord with the French law as recorded in the
writings of Troplong and Pardessus.6 1 It recognized that a prac-
tice had grown up in Louisiana of seizing the assets of the part-
nership but attributed that practice to a mistaken reliance on
common law authorities.62
The common law authorities to which the Louisiana court
referred were early English decisions, 68 holding that the sheriff
in executing a judgment against a partner could seize partner-
ship property and sell an undivided interest in it regardless of
the state of accounts between the partners, and that the vendee
became a tenant in common with the other partners. The Lou-
isiana court noted that subsequent English decisions had ques-
56. Ibid.
57. United States v. Baulos' Ex'r, 5 Mart (N.S.) 567 (La. 1827); Bank of
Tennessee v. McKeage, 11 Rob. 130 (La. 1845).
58. See p. 456, supra.
59. 3 La. Ann. 319 (1848).
60. Id. at 322.
61. Ibid.
62. Id. at 323.
63. Heydon v. Heydon, 1 Salk 392 (1693); Jacky v. Butler, 2 Ld. Raymond
871 (1704). Cf. Fox v. Hanbury, Cowp. 445 (1776).
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tioned the correctness of the early cases; 6 4 but it was not aware,
probably because the latest English legal materials were not
available in Louisiana, that at the time Smith v. McMicken was
decided the English practice already had been modified. By that
time a sheriff in England could make only a constructive levy
(he was not privileged to remove the specific items of property
from the possession of the other partners) and could sell only
an undivided interest in the property corresponding to the deb-
tor's interest in the firm.6 5
Only minor variations now exist in American jurisdictions in
a separate creditor's rights to proceed against partnership prop-
erty. Courts championing the entity theory, as might be expected,
use language similar to that of the Louisiana courts. They assert
that until partnership debts are paid and the surplus divided
among the partners a separate creditor cannot attach partnership
property, that all he can do is to attach the partner's interest in
the firm.66 The results attained in aggregate jurisdictions are not
radically different: courts in aggregate jurisdictions do not per-
mit a separate creditor to attach and cause to be sold specific
items of partnership property. Most aggregate courts, it is true,
still permit a levy on partnership property and permit the sheriff
actually to take possession. But they have adopted the English
view (prior to the English Partnership Act of 1890) as to the
nature of the interest sold: the purchaser does not receive title
to an undivided share of the property but only to the indebted
partner's interest in the firm.6 7 Other American jurisdictions have
followed English practice prior to the English Partnership Act
of 1890 both in limiting the levy to a constructive one and in
permitting a sale only of the debtor partner's interest in the
firm.68
The Uniform Partnership Act, following in this respect the
English Partnership Act of 1890,69 provides for a charging order
in favor of a separate judgment creditor on a debtor partner's
interest in the firm.70 The charging order authorized by the Uni-
form Partnership Act is similar in effect not only to the practice
64. 3 La. Ann. 319, 323 (1848).
65. Note (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 436, 439 and authorities there cited.
66. Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criti-
cism (1915) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 158, 181(n).
67. White v. Jones, 38 Ill. 159 (1865); Wickham v. Davis, 24 Minn. 167
(1877); Deal v. Bogue, 20 Pa. 228, 57 Am. Dec. 702 (1853); Crane, Handbook
of the Law of Partnership (1938) 159-160, § 43.
68. See Note (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 436, 440.
69. 53-54 Victoria, c. 29, § 23.
70. U.P.A. § 28(1).
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prevailing in England prior to the English Partnership Act but
also to the practice followed in Louisiana. Under the Uniform
Partnership Act 7' and in Louisiana 72 a partner's interest in spe-
cific partnership property is not subject to attachment on the
claim of a partner's separate creditor. Under the act the debtor
partner's interest in the firm can be charged with the payment
of a separate debt;7 3 in Louisiana "the residuary interest of the
partner in the partnership generally" can be "seized," but the
partnership property remains in the possession of the partners.74
Neither under the act nor in Louisiana is the sheriff permitted to
disrupt unnecessarily partnership affairs by taking possession of
firm property. The act permits a sale of the interest charged;7 5
the Louisiana courts permit sale of the interest "seized. °7 6 The
interest of the debtor partner which a separate creditor can charge
under the act 77 or attach in Louisiana 7 is subject to the rights
of firm creditors and of his co-partners. The only difference in
practice-and the importance of this difference is questionable-
is that in Louisiana a seizure of a partner's interest in the firm
operates as a dissolution of the partnership;7 9 under the Uniform
Act a charging order does not of itself dissolve the partnership, 0
but the court must decree a dissolution on application by the pur-
chaser of the interest charged.8 '
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has used the entity theory
to support a holding that on the death of a partner firm funds
cannot be applied to the allowance of his minor child left in
necessitous circumstances8 2 if such an application of partnership
71. U.P.A. § 25(2c).
72. Authorities cited note 52, supra.
73. U.P.A. § 28.
74. Smith v. McMicken, 3 La. Ann. 319, 322 (1848).
75. See U.P.A. § 28(2).
76. Art. 2823, La. Civil Code of 1870; Pittman & Barrow v. Robicheau, 14
La. Ann. 108 (1859). Numerous authorities for this proposition are listed in
Toelke v. Toelke, 153 La. 697, 704, 96 So. 536, 539 (1923), but careful examina-
tion of the judgment of the district court for the Parish of Orleans which
was reinstated by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Toelke v. Toelke raises
a serious question as to whether the sale of the interest of a partner in the
firm or merely his interest in a specific firm asset was ordered.
77. U.P.A. § 40.
78. Art. 2823, La. Civil Code of 1870; Smith v. McMicken, 3 La. Ann. 319
(1848); Pittman & Barrow v. Robicheau, 14 La. Ann. 108 (1859). Cf. Christen
v. Ruhlman, 22 La. Ann. 570 (1870); Carter Bros. & Co. v. Galloway & Burns,
36 La. Ann. 473 (1884).
79. Art. 2823, La. Civil Code of 1870.
80. U.P.A. § 28(2).
81. U.P.A. § 32(2).
82. A widow or minor child left in necessitous circumstances has a pre-
ferred claim under certain conditions to $1,000 from the succession (estate)
of the deceased. Art. 3252, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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funds prejudices partnership creditors.8 3 Yet, the same result is
reached in most aggregate jurisdictions.8 4 The Uniform Partner-
ship Act expressly provides that a partner's right in specific
partnership property is not subject to dower, curtesy, or allow-
ances to widows, heirs or next of kin.8 5 As a matter of fact, an
examination of the first Louisiana case 6 holding that the privi-
leged claim of a minor child left in necessitous circumstances
cannot be asserted against partnership property to the prejudice
of firm creditors shows that the court's holding was in part sup-
ported by the writings of Story. 7
Louisiana partnership practice in actions by or against firms
differs considerably from the practice in many Anglo-American
jurisdictions. This dissimilarity is the only one of importance
ascribable to Louisiana's adherence to the entity theory.
At common law, of course, the partnership, since it did not
have a legal existence separate from the individuals composing
it, could not sue or be sued in its firm name.8 8 Actions for the
firm had to be brought in the names of the partners, 9 and actions
to enforce firm liabilities had to be brought against the individual
partners.90 These common law rules in many states have not been
changed by statute.91
Early Louisiana practice seems to have been similar, the
partners joining to sue in their own names on firm claims and
being joined as parties defendant in suits on firm obligations.9 2
In 1859, however, in Key v. Box 9 the Supreme Court of Louisi-
ana decreed that, during the existence of a partnership, suit must
be brought against the firm and not against individual partners.
The court did not mention the entity theory; but, since in cases
decided only a few years before the court had given much
thought to the nature of the partnership,94 the decision in Key v.
83. Succession of Pilcher, 39 La. Ann. 362, 1 So. 929 (1887).
84. See Crane, Handbook of the Law of Partnership (1938) 169-174, § 45;
Mechem, Elements of'the Law of Partnership (2 ed. 1920) 146-147, § 165.
85. U.P.A. § 25(2e).
86. Succession of Stauffer, 21 La. Ann. 520 (1869).
87. 21 La. Ann. 520, 521.
88. Woodfln v. Curry, 228 Ala. 436, 153 So. 620 (1934); Staley v. Bismarck
Bank, 48 N.D. 1264, 189 N.W. 236 (1922); Note (1946) 20 St. John's L. Rev. 109.
89. Staley v. Bismarck Bank, 48 N.D. 1264, 189 N.W. 236 (1922); Martin v.
Hemphill, 237 S.W. 550 (Tex. App. 1922); Mechem, op. cit. supra note 84, at
288-289, § 325.
90. Hotchkiss v. Di Vita, 103 Conn. 436, 130 Atl. 668 (1925); Mechem, op.
cit. supra note 84, at 296-297, § 333.
91. Lewis v. West Side Trust & Savings Bank, 377 Ill. 384, 36 N.E.(2d)
573 (1941); Bubble Up Bottling Co. v. Lewis, 163 S.W.(2d) 875 (Tex. App.
1942).
92. See David v. Elol, 4 La. 106, 107 (1832).
93. 14 La. Ann. 497 (1859).
94. See p. 454, supra.
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Box well might be attributed to the channeling of the court's
thinking along entity lines.
Even after the Key v. Box decision and up to 1900, at least in
suits brought on firm claims, the courts continued to permit
partners to appear in their own names as parties litigant.9 5 In
1900, however, the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Wolf v. New
Orleans Tailor-Made Pants Company96 affirmed dismissal of a
suit brought in the names of individual partners and enunciated
definitively that litigation on firm claims must be brought in the
firm name. The decision was grounded on the idea that the firm
was the legal entity which owned the cause of action. Subse-
quent decisions have followed the line of reasoning advanced in
Wolf v. New Orleans Tailor Made Pants Company. In Louisiana
law it is now firmly established not only that the firm is capable
of bringing suit in the firm name and is subject to suit in the firm
name but also that during the existence of the partnership actions
on firm claims can be maintained by the firm alone97 and litiga-
tion based on partnership obligations must be brought against
the firm and not against the individual partners.9 8
In a number of Anglo-American jurisdictions the common
law rules prohibiting actions by and against firms have been modi-
fied by statutes, the effect of which is to bring the practice in
those jurisdictions more nearly into accord with Louisiana prac-
tice. Some statutes permit partnerships both to sue and to be
sued in the firm names. 9 Others permit suits against partner-
ships in their firm names, either generally or where the names
of members are unknown when the action is commenced. 0 0
Most statutes permitting suits by or against a partnership
are permissive, not mandatory. 10 ' Unlike in Louisiana, partners
in jurisdictions having these statutes still may bring suit on firm
95. See Wolf v. New Orleans Tailor-Made Pants Co., 52 La. Ann. 1357,
1368, 27 So. 893, 898 (1900).
96. 52 La. Ann. 1357, 27 So. 893 (1900).
97. Wolf v. New Orleans Tailor-Made Pants Co., 52 La. Ann. 1357, 27 So.
893 (1900); E. B. Hayes Machinery Co. v. Eastham, 147 La. 347, 84 So. 898
(1920); Snyder v. Davison, 172 La. 274, 134 So. 89 (1931).
98. Key v. Box, 14 La. Ann. 497 (1859); Snyder v. Davison, 172 La. 274,
134 So. 89 (1931), and authorities there cited. See also Liverpool, Brazil &
River Platte Navigation Co. v. Agar & Lelong, 14 Fed. 615 (1882); 1 McMahon,
Louisiana Practice (1939) 191.
99. Gilmore, Handbook on the Law of Partnership (1911) 566, § 195;
Mechem, Elements of the Law of Partnership (2 ed. 1920) 292, § 328; Pollock,
Law of Partnership (14 ed. by Turner, 1944) 123-124; Note (1946) 20 St. John's
L. Rev. 109, 110.
100. Code of Ga. (1933) §§ 75-312; Hotchkiss v. Di Vita, 103 Conn. 436, 130
Atl. 668 (1925); Mechem, op. cit. supra note 99, at 298, § 337.
101. 40 Am. Jur. (Partnership) § 435; Gilmore, loc. cit. supra note 99.
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claims and third persons may sue a firm in the individual names
of its members. Even in most entity jurisdictions, the statutes
retain the common law practice as a permissible procedure.
10 2
Several statutes, as interpreted by the courts, carry the en-
tity idea even further than the Louisiana decisions. The Louisiana
courts, in spite of their adherence to the entity view and their
holdings that the partnership is the proper party litigant, insist
that the pleading show the partnership as appearing in court
"through and represented by all of the partners composing the
partnership; their full names and residence being set out.' u0 3
On the other hand, an Alabama court, in applying the Alabama
statute, held the designation of the defendant partnership by the
firm name without more was sufficient. 0 4 Similarly, under the
Iowa statute a judgment can be obtained and enforced against
the partnership entirely apart from its individual members. 0 5
Alabama courts also carry the entity theory to its logical
conclusion in the effect they give a judgment obtained against
a partnership. They hold that such a judgment binds only the
property of the firm, that it cannot be made the basis of a suit
against the partners. 0 6 If the partners are sued at all, the suit
must be on the original demand.10 7 Louisiana courts, on the con-
trary, seem in effect to abandon the entity theory at time of judg-
ment. Partners in Louisiana, it is true, cannot be made to respond
except in a suit against the firm; 08 but, if the debt is established
by suit, judgment is rendered against the partners as well as
against the firm. If the firm is commercial, the judgment against
the firm and the partners will be in solido;10 9 if the firm is an
ordinary one, the judgment will be against the firm and against
each partner for his "virile" share.", The practice of rendering
judgment against the partners appears to be a carry-over from
102. Code of Iowa (1935) § 10983.
103. Wolf v. New Orleans Tailor-Made Pants Co., 52 La. Ann. 1357, 1368,
27 So. 893, 898 (1900); Bankston Bros. v. Morrison, 190 So. 195 (La. App.
1939).
104. Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Watford, 19 So.(2d) 77 (Ala. App. 1944).
105. See Western Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 42 F. Supp.
1007, 1011 (S.D. Iowa, 1941), and authorities there cited.
106. Ratchford v. Covington County Stock Co., 172 Ala. 461, 55 So. 806
(1911).
107. Ibid.
108. E. B. Hayes Machinery Co. v. Eastham, 147 La. 347, 84 So. 898 (1920);
Snyder v. Davison, 172 La. 274, 134 So: 89 (1931).
109. Art. 2872, La. Civil Code of 1870; Bell v. Massey & Poultney, 14 La.
Ann. 831 (1859); First Nat. Bank v. Knighton Bros., 16 La. App. 407, 134 So.
706 (1931). Cf. Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. E. C. Drew Inv. Co.,
107 La. 251, 31 So. 736 (1902).
110. Art. 2873, La. Civil Code of 1870; National Oil Works v. Korn Bros.,
164 La. 800, 114 So. 659 (1927).
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cases decided prior to the acceptance of the entity view by the
Louisiana courts, cases which apparently approved the practice
of rendering judgment only against the partners. 1 ' Later Louisi-
ana cases indicate that the proper procedure is to render judg-
ment against both firm and partners. 1 12
The Louisiana courts consistently have held that, since the
partnership is an entity separate and apart from the partners,
partnership debts cannot be compensated against the claims of
an individual partner or the debts of an individual partner against
partnership claims. 1 13 "Compensation," incidentally, is a civil law
term roughly equivalent to common law set-off; the one differ-
ence is that compensation can take place by operation of law
while a set-off must be pleaded.1 4 In Louisiana an individual
defendant cannot plead in compensation to his debt a claim he
has against a firm of which the plaintiff is a member;1' 5 and a
member of a firm sued by his individual creditor cannot plead
in compensation a debt due by that creditor to the firm." 6 Like-
wise, a firm debt cannot be compensated by a credit of an indi-
vidual partner.1" 7 Similarly, in a suit by a partnership to recover
on firm claims the defendant cannot establish claims against an
individual partner of the plaintiff firm and plead them in com-
pensation. 1 i8 Yet the identical result is reached in aggregate jur-
isdictions in every one of these situations; a set-off is not allowed
because of "a lack of mutuality of parties."1 9 Though the reason
given by the Anglo-American courts differs from that given by
the Louisiana courts, the underlying practice unquestionably is
the same.
111. See David v. Eloi, 4 La. 106, 107 (1832); Chapman v. Early, 12 La.
230 (1838).
112. National Oil Works v. Korn Bros., 164 La. 800, 114 So. 659 (1927). Cf.
Liverpool, Brazil & River Platte Navigation Co. v. Agar & Lelong, 14 Fed.
615, 616 (1882).
113. See notes 115, 116, 117, and 118, infra. Nor does "confusion" (see Art.
2217, La. Civil Code of 1870) take place between such debts and claims. Suc-
cession of Arick, 22 La. Ann. 501 (1870).
114. Arts. 2207, 2208, La. Civil Code of 1870.
115. Key v. Box, 14 La. Ann. 497 (1859).
116. See Smith v. McMicken, 3 La. Ann. 319, 322 (1848). Cf. Ward v.
Brandt, 11 Mart.(O.S.) 331 (La. 1822).
117. Atkinson & Co. v. Hibernia Nat. Bank in New Orleans, 186 La. 1074,
173 So. 768 (1937). Cf. Galloway v. Vivian State Bank, 168 La. 691, 123 So.
126 (1929).
118. Lewis v. Moore, 9 Rob. 196 (La. 1844); Smith v. McMicken, 3 La.
Ann. 319, 322 (1848). Cf. Findley v. Breedlove, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 105 (La. 1826).
119. Crane, Handbook of the Law of Partnership (1938) 272-273, § 63;
Mechem, Elements of the Law of Partnership (2 ed. 1920) 300-301, § 341. But
a set-off will be allowed in some Anglo-American jurisdictions under excep-
tional circumstances to prevent hardship. Marcum v. Wilhoit, 290 Ky. 532,
162 S.W.(2d) 10 (1942).
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The Louisiana courts feel that still other rules follow from
the fact that the partnership is an entity, but in each instance
investigation will show that quite similar rules prevail in aggre-
gate jurisdictions. For instance, in Louisiana the rule that a part-
nership can become a member of another firm is grounded on
the idea that each partnership is a separate entity. 120 Yet the
same rule long has prevailed in common law jurisdictions. 12 1 In
Jurgens v. Ittman 22 the supreme court utilized the entity theory
in a rather unusual way. The mental capacity of one partner be-
came impaired. His co-partner continued to carry on firm business
and entered into a contract on behalf of the firm with a third
person who was unaware of the other partner's mental condi-
tion. The court held that the validity of the contract was not
affected by the mental weakness of one of the partners. The
holding was based on the theory that, the partnership being a
distinct entity, the consent of any one of the members is the
consent of the firm. Yet, the same result has been reached in
similar cases in aggregate jurisdictions. 23 In fact, the court in
deciding Jurgens v. Ittman relied much on a case from an aggre-
gate jurisdiction. 24
The Louisiana cases thus far examined show that the Lou-
isiana courts' devotion to the entity theory has not prevented
them in most situations from attaining results virtually identical
with those reached in Anglo-American jurisdictions. And in one
comparatively recent case, Dezendorf v. National Casualty Com-
pany, 25 a Louisiana court ignored the entity the6ry altogether
when adherence to it made difficult a decision in accord with the
jurisprudence of other states. In the Dezendorf case plaintiff and
Prudhomme, carpenters, entered into a partnership contract. Each
was to receive $35 a week, and profits were to be divided equally.
The plaintiff, having been injured on a partnership job, brought
suit under the Workmen's Compensation Act against the partner-
ship and its insurer. The plaintiff's contention was that he was
an employee and that the partnership, a distinct entity, was his
employer. On appeal the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit
120. Clements v. Luby Oil Co., 15 La. App. 384, 387, 130 So. 851, 853 (1930),
and authorities there cited.
121. Houston v. McCrory, 140 Okla. 21, 282 Pac. 149 (1929); McLaughlin
v. Mulloy, 14 Utah 490, 47 Pac. 1031 (1897).
122. 47 La. Ann. 367, 16 So. 952 (1895).
123. Raymond v. Vaughan, 128 Ill. 256, 21 N.E. 566 (1889); Pritchett v.
Thomas Plater & Co., 144 Tenn. 406, 232 S.W. 961 (1921).
124. Raymond v. Vaughan, 128 Ill. 256, 21 N.E. 566 (1889), discussed in
Jurgens v. Ittman, 47 La. Ann. 367, 372, 16 So. 952, 954 (1895).
125. 171 So. 160 (La. App. 1936).
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conceded that the partnership was an entity126 but failed to dis-
cuss the bearing, if any, which that fact had on the question being
litigated. The court completely disregarded the entity argument
and instead looked to Anglo-American jurisdictions for guidance.
It cited thirty-one Anglo-American cases and adopted the rule
which, with the exceptions of Oklahoma 127 and Michigan,' 28 pre-
vails in Anglo-American jurisdictions, namely, that a partner
cannot recover compensation as an employee from the partner-
ship of which he is a member.' 29 That rule applies in Anglo-
American jurisdictions even though the partner performs labor
with the employees of the partnership and does the same kind of
work as employees. 30 The reason usually given for this rule is
that the Workmen's Compensatior Act does not contemplate the
"canomaly of one person occupying the dual relation of Master
and Servant.'31 Perhaps if the question is ever presented, the
Louisiana Supreme Court will carry the entity idea to its logical
extreme as the Oklahoma courts have done. It is interesting to
note, however, that at least one entity jurisdiction other than
Louisiana has accepted the majority rule.' 32
One problem which has interested legal scholars is whether
a partner when acting within the scope of partnership business
is the agent of the firm or whether he is the agent of his co-part-
ners as individuals. In Louisiana and in other entity jurisdic-
tions 3 the partner is regarded as acting for the firm as principal.
In aggregate jurisdictions, on the other hand, the partners are
considered agents, not of the firm, but of one another; a paFtner.
is deemed an agent of his co-partners when he is acting, and as
a principal of a co-partner when the latter is acting." 4 Courts in
aggregate jurisdictions find themselves involved in some logical
difficulties because, according to the aggregate theory, the part-
ner engaged in partnership transactions is acting as a principal
for himself and at the same time as an agent for his co-partners.
126. Ibid.
127. Ohio Drilling Co. v. State Industrial Comm., 86 Okla. 139, 207 Pac.
314 (1922); Ardmore Paint & Oil Products Co. v. State Industrial Comm., 109
Okla. 81, 234 Pac. 582 (1925).
128. Gallie v. Detroit Auto Accessory Co., 224 Mich. 703, 195 N.W. 667
(1923); Chisholm v. Chisholm Const. Co., 298 Mich. 25, 298 N.W. 390 (1921).
129. Dube v. Robinson, 92 N.H. 312, 30 A.(2d) 482 (1943). A lengthy array
of authority can be found in Dezendorf v. National Casualty Co., 171 So. 160
(La. App. 1936).
130. Dube v. Robinson, 92 N.H. 312, 30 A.(2d) 482 (1943).
131. Rasmussen v. Trico Feed Mills, 148 Neb. 855, 29 N.W.(2d) 641, 642
(1947); Dube v. Robinson, 92 N.H. p12, 30 A.(2d) 482, 484 (1943).
132. Rasmussen v. Trico Feed Mills, 148 Neb. 855, 29 N.W.(2d) 641 (1947).
133. Crane, Handbook of the Law of Partnership (1938) 187, § 48.
134. First Nat. Bank of Ann Arbor v. Farson, 226 N.Y. 218, 123 N.E. 490,
491 (1919); Gilmore, Handbook on the Law of Partnership (1911) 274, § 84.
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In reality, the decisions even in aggregate jurisdictions in- effect
recognize the firm as the principal;13 5 and the Uniform Partner-
ship Act expressly provides that every partner is "an agent of
the partnership for the purpose of its business." 91 30
Many Anglo-American courts utilize the theories as to the
nature of the partnerships to support constructions of statutes or
interpretations of insurance policies or other contracts.137 Wil-
liams v. Hartshorn1 85 and In re Morrison's Estate 3 9 are typical
examples of the use of the aggregate conception in construing
statutes. In Williams v. Hartshorn the deceased, an employee of
a partnership, died as a result of injuries arising out of and in
the course of his employment. One of the partners owned the
premises where the partnership business was conducted and
where the deceased was killed. The administrator of the deceased
brought a common law action for negligence against the partner
who owned the premises. The court held that the intent of the
Workmen's Compensation law was to relieve the employer of all
liability other than compensation; and that, since a partnership
is not a separate entity, the statute relieved the defendant from
liability.
In the Morrison's Estate case the court had under considera-
tion the Liquid Fuel Tax Act of Pennsylvania, which provides
that all taxes collected by a dealer shall be a lien upon his fran-
chise or property. The court held that, a partnership not being
an entity, the individual partners were the dealers within the
meaning of the taxing statute, and that the lien extended not
only to the property used in the partnership business but to all
separate property of the partners.
A Mississippi case, Fidelity Phoenix Fire Insurance Com-
pany v. Howard,'40 is an example of the use of the aggregate
theory in interpreting a contract. In that case A and B operated
as partners two businesses, one a radio shop, the other a motor
company. The businesses were operated in the same building but
they had separate firm names and the bookkeeping and all de-
tails of operation were kept separate. C, an employee of the radio
135. Caswell v. Maplewood Garage, 84 N.H. 241, 149 Atl. 746 (1930); Gil-
more, loc. cit. supra note 134.
136. Section 9(1). The English Partnership Act of 1890 is similar. See
Strahan and Oldham, The Law of Partnership (6 ed. by Hanbury, 1944) 37.
137. Fidelity Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Howard, 182 Miss. 546, 181 So. 846
(1938); State v. Pielsticker, 118 Neb. 419, 225 N.W. 51 (1929); Williams v.
Hartshorn, 296 N.Y. 49, 69 N.E.(2d) 557 (1946); In re Morrison's Estate, 343
Pa. 157, 22 A.(2d) 729 (1941); Note (1941) 41 Col. L. Rev. 698, 702-703.
138. 296 N.Y. 49, 69 N.E.(2d) 557 (1946).
139. 343 Pa. 157, 22 A.(2d) 729 (1941).
140. 182 Miss. 546, 181 So. 846 (1938).
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shop, stole an automobile belonging to the motor company. The
automobile was insured for the benefit of the motor company,
but the policy excepted from its coverage thefts by employees of
the insured. In a suit by A and B to recover on the policy, the
court held that since a partnership has no legal existence distinct
from the persons who compose it, the automobile belonged to
the same persons who employed C and therefore the theft was
not covered by the policy.
The courts in other jurisdictions, on the other hand, tend to
interpret statutes in the light of the entity theory. In State v.
Pielsticker141 defendants, officers and directors of a state bank,
were members of a partnership which borrowed money from the
bank. They were charged with violating a criminal statute pro-
hibiting a bank's officers or directors from borrowing from it
without first securing the consent of the bank's board of directors.
The court held the defendants not guilty because the partnership
which borrowed the money was a legal entity distinct from the
partners. In Anderson v. Dukes' 2 the entity theory was used in
the interpretation of an insurance contract. The insurer had is-
sued a Workman's Compensation policy to A individually. As a
defense in a suit on the policy the insurer claimed that the em-
ployee had been injured while working on operations of a part-
nership of which A was a member. The court held that a partner-
ship constitutes an entirely different employer from one of the
partners, and that the evidence would have to be reviewed to
determine whether the employee had been injured on a partner-
ship or on an individual operation.
The Louisiana courts also have utilized the entity concept
in construing statutes 43 and in interpreting contracts. 4 4 In First
National Bank of Shreveport v. Davis 45 a partnership of which
the plaintiff's debtor was a member transferred its assets in bulk
to a corporation without complying with the provisions of the
Bulk Sales Act.146 Plaintiff brought suit against his debtor and
against the corporation for the amount of the indebtedness and
prayed that the transfer of assets be set aside and that writs of
attachment issue against the property. The court refused to dis-
141. 118 Neb. 419, 225 N.W. 51 (1929).
142. 193 Okla. 395, 143 P.(2d) 800 (1943).
143. First Nat. Bank of Shreveport v. Davis, 147 So. 93 (La. App. 1933).
144. Terzia v. The Grand Leader, 176 La. 151, 145 So. 363 (1932). Cf. Zuzak
v. Querbes, 193 So. 258 (La. App. 1939).
145. 147 So. 93 (La. App. 1933). Cf. United States v. Baulos' Ex'r, 5 Mart.
(N.S.) 567 (La. 1827).
146. La. Act 270 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 9037-9045].
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turb the transfer, holding that the partnership, a civil person with
distinct "rights and attributes," was not under an obligation to
comply with the Bulk Sales Act with respect to the claim of the
plaintiff.
In Terzia v. The Grand Leader14 plaintiff leased certain
property to the deceased allegedly for the use and benefit of a
commercial firm composed of the deceased and two other mem-
bers. After the deceased died, the surviving partners continued
to operate under the firm name and to occupy leased property.
Plaintiff brought suit against the firm and the surviving partners
for rent due, requesting a provisional seizure of merchandise in
the leased building.148 The court held that even if that lease be
conceded to have been made to the partnership, the firm was dis-
solved by the death of deceased; that, the firm being a distinct
legal entity, the surviving partners were not tenants of the plain-
tiff; that where no contract, express or implied, exists between
the owner of a building and the one who occupies it, the owner
is not entitled to a lessor's privilege or a provisional seizure of
property in the building.
The use of the entity or aggregate conception is not helpful
in interpreting statutes or contracts. A scrutiny of many cases
will show that the entity or the aggregate theory upon which
the courts purport to rely is nothing more than a convenient
rationalization of a result actually predicated on other considera-
tions. In other cases the courts seem to become involved in the
abstract question of whether or not a partnership is a legal unit
and apparently lose sight of their objective, the ascertaining of
legislative intent or of the intentions of contracting parties. In
Fidelity Phoenix Fire Insurance Company v. Howard 49 and in
State v. Pielsticker,50 for instance, the courts seem to have com-
plicated their problems unnecessarily by considering the legal
nature of the partnership. In giving effect to statutes or to con-
tracts, the courts, rather than following a predetermined theory
as to the nature of a partnership, should attempt to carry out the
purposes of the legislature or to determine the intentions of the
parties to a contract. Unwary courts often carry deductions from
a particular theory over into areas where such deductions prop-
erly have no application.
The aggregate and entity ideas are not premises from which
147. 176 La. 151, 145 So. 363 (1933).
148. See Art. 2705, La. Civil Code of 1870; Art. 285, La. Code of Practice
of 1870.
149. 182 Miss. 546, 181 So. 846 (1938).
150. 118 Neb. 419, 225 N.W. 51 (1929).
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to reason. These concepts are purely linguistic devices151 some-
times useful in clarifying ideas. That the use of such concepts is
not at all essential is demonstrated by the fact that some courts
frequently decide without mentioning the aggregate or the en-
tity theory the same kinds of cases in which other courts discuss
one or the other of those theories at great length. The courts
should recognize frankly that to regard the partnership as an
entity is useful for some purposes but not for others. It is defi-
nitely undesirable to accept a particular theory of the juridical
nature of the partnership and then to reason abstractly from that
theory, deducing rules rather than developing practical solutions
for particular problems.
That neither the aggregate nor the entity theory can be fol-
lowed consistently in all situations has been recognized by many
judges. Courts in aggregate jurisdictions in particular often have
shown a tendency to abandon the aggregate theory in certain
situations,'15 2 and quite often legislatures in aggregate jurisdic-
tions find it desirable to treat a partnership as an entity for cer-
tain purposes.1 3 The departures from the aggregate theory often
are made consciously. Thus a California court' 54 conceded that
the partnership is frequently regarded as an entity in reference
to particular rights and obligations, and a New Jersey court said
that, while
"... a partnership does not have a separate existence for all
purposes and is by no means of such .detached individualism
as is a corporation . . ., nevertheless in diverse respects a
partnership may, in this jurisdiction, come within the legal
conception of a distinctive being, viz., an entity."' 55
Even a New York court 15 has conceded that, while as a general
rule a partnership is not a legal entity separate and apart from
151. Mason v. Mitchell, 135 F.(2d) 599, 600-601 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943).
152. Farney v. Hauser, 109 Kan. 75, 198 Pac. 178 (1921); Evans v. Thorn-
ton, 159 Kan. 149, 152 P.(2d) 853 (1944); Fiston v. Unemployment Compensa-
tion Comm., 132 N.J.L. 276, 39 A.(2d) 697 (1944); Schwartzman v. Miller, 262
App. Div. 635, 30 N.Y.S.(2d) 882 (1941), affirmed In re Rose Schwartzman, 288
N.Y. 568, 42 N.E.(2d) 22 (1942).
153. "Obviously it was the legislative intent to treat a partnership as an
employing unit separate and apart from its several partners." Schwartzman
v. Miller, 262 App. Div. 635, 30 N.Y.S.(2d) 882, 884 (1941),, affirmed In re Rose
Schwartzman, 288 N.Y. 568, 42 N.E.(2d) 22 (1942). See also U.P.A. §§ 8, 10.
154. Park v. Union Mfg. Co., 114 P.(2d) 373, 375 (Cal. App. 1941). Cf. Reed
v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 10 Cal.(2d) 191, 73 P.(2d) 1212, 1213 (1937).
155. Finston v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 132 N.J.L. 276, 29
A.(2d) 697, 698 (1944).
156. Schwartzman v. Miller, 262 App. Div. 635, 30 N.Y.S.(2d) 882, 884
(1941), affirmed In re Rose Schwartzman, 288 N.Y. 568, 42 N.E.(2d) 22 (1942).
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the individuals composing the firm, "yet for many purposes a
partnership is regarded by the courts as a separate entity."
Courts in entity jurisdictions similarly will disregard the
entity theory under exceptional circumstances, much as courts
pierce a corporate entity to achieve desired results.157 Thus, in
Chisholm v. Chisholm Construction Company5 5 the Michigan
court stated that "to prevent an injustice or fraud, we do not
hesitate to disregard the fictional entity of the partnership and
regard the members as individuals." Dezendorf v. National Cas-
ualty Company, 5 9 previously discussed,160 is an example of a
Louisiana case in which the court disregarded the entity.
The conclusion seems unavoidable that Louisiana's entity
theory has not resulted in practices which differentiate Louisiana
law from law in other states. In the first place, many states have
adopted entity ideas which even verbally are not much different
from the entity concept Louisiana borrowed from the French
commentators. But more significant, this section has shown that
many of the supposed differences between the aggregate and
entity theories are purely verbal. In most situations where the
Louisiana courts utilize the entity theory to explain their con-
clusions, underlying practices in Louisiana do not differ from
practices prevailing in aggregate jurisdictions. Further, an analy-
sis of the cases in Louisiana and in other jurisdictions shows that
the courts often use the entity or aggregate concepts as a con-
venient rationalization for conclusions actually predicated on
other grounds. That many courts are beginning to realize that
neither theory furnishes an adequate premise from which to
deduce rules to fit all problems is demonstrated by their depar-
ture from the prevailing theory whenever an occasion seems to
demand. If partnership practice in Louisiana differs materially
from practice in other states, those differences cannot be attrib-
uted to the Louisiana courts' adherence to the entity view.
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF LOUISIANA CLASSIFICATIONS
OF PARTNERSHIPS
The aim of this section is to examine the various kinds of
Louisiana partnerships to ascertain (1) whether the Louisiana
157. See Rasmussen v. Trico Feed Mills, 148 Neb. 855, 29 N.W.(2d) 641
(1947). "It is not necessary to carry the idea [legal entity] to extremes. Its
limitations will be defined as cases in point arise." Caswell v. Maplewood
Garage, 84 N.H. 241, 149 Atl. 746, 752 (1930).
158. 298 Mich. 25, 298 N.W. 390, 393 (1941).
159. 171 So. 160 (La. App. 1936).
160. See p. 466, supra.
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devices have counterparts in Anglo-American jurisdictions, (2)
whether the Louisiana classifications serve useful purposes, and
(3) whether the rules relating to each kind of Louisiana partner-
ship are more satisfactory or less satisfactory than those relating
to the most nearly corresponding Anglo-American devices. An
initial difficulty encountered is to determine definitely what
classes of partnerships exist in Louisiana law and what incidents
are characteristic of each. Lawyers and jurists in Louisiana at
times have used a single designation to refer to two distinct de-
vices and on occasions have affixed two different appellations to
a single device.
A number of articles in the Louisiana Civil Code purport to
classify Louisiana partnerships' 6 1 and to define each kind of part-
nership. 16 2 These provisions-read alone-are contradictory and
perplexing. Article 2824163 classifies partnerships "as to their ob-
ject" into commercial partnerships and ordinary partnerships.
Commercial partnerships are defined by Article 2825164 as those
partnerships which are formed:
"1. For the purchase of any personal property and the
sale thereof, either in the same state or changed by manu-
facture.
"2. For buying or selling any personal property what-
ever, as factors or brokers.
"3. For carrying personal property or passengers for hire,
in ships, vessels or in any other vehicle for transportation."
Article 2826165 defines ordinary partnerships as "all such as are
not commercial" and divides them into universal and particular
partnerships. A universal partnership, according to Article 2829,166
is a contract by which the parties agree to make a common stock
of either (1) all personal property they possess, or (2) the
fruits167 from all such personal property, or (3) all property both
real and personal possessed by the parties, or (4) the fruits from
all property of both types. The universal partnership, by defini-
tion therefore, may include businesses of a commercial nature.
That commercial firms can be carried on under universal part-
nership is confirmed by Article 2832.168
161. Arts. 2824, 2826,'2827, 2828, La. Civil Code of 1870.
162. Arts. 2825, 2826, 2829, 2830, 2835, 2839, La. Civil Code of 1870.
163. La. Civil Code of 1870.
164. Ibid.
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid.
167. For a definition of "fruits," see Art. 545, La. Civil Code of 1870.
168. La. Civil Code of 1870.
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Article 2829, read in connection with Article 2832, seems in-
consistent with Article 2826 since, as has been previously indi-
cated, the latter article defines ordinary partnerships as "all such
as are not commercial" and states that universal partnerships
are a subdivision of ordinary partnerships. Furthermore, Article
2835169 defines particular partnerships as "such as are formed for
any business not of a commercial nature," a definition which
makes particular partnerships identical with ordinary partner-
ships as defined by Article 2826. An additional reason exists for
questioning the accuracy of the definition of particular partner-
ships contained in Article 2835. Under that definition those uni-
versal partnerships which are not commercial in nature would
be particular partnerships; yet, as has been noted, universal part-
nerships and particular partnerships, according to Article 2826,
are the two subcategories of ordinary partnerships.
To clarify the articles of the Louisiana Civil Code classifying
partnerships, resort must be had to provisions of the French Civil
Code, to those of earlier Louisiana codes, and to the writings of
the French commentators. An examination of the backgrounds
of the various kinds of Louisiana partnerships and a study of
corresponding French concepts reveal a solution to the problems
raised by the discrepancies in the provisions of the present Lou-
isiana Civil Code.
The French Civil Code'10 makes a primary classification of
partnerships by stipulating that partnerships "are either univer-
sal or particular." In other words, all partnerships which are not
universal are particular partnerships. The Louisiana Civil Code
of 1808 contained an identical provision.171 As can be seen from
Article 2829 of the Louisiana Civil Code or corresponding provi-
sions in the French Civil Code,172 the universal partnership actu-
ally is a contract creating a community of property. The true
partnerships are those which are not universal, that is, the par-
ticular partnerships. 178 In universal partnerships the parties pool
all their assets or all their personal property; in particular part-
nerships the partners pool only particular property or specified
services. The French Civil Code describes the particular partner-
ship as follows:
169. La. Civil Code of 1870.
170. Art. 1835, French Civil Code.
171. La. Civil Code of 1808, Art. 6, p. 388.
172. Arts. 1836, 1837, French Civil Code.
173. In Bougerol v. Allard, 6 Rob. 351, 352 (La. 1844), the court erroneously
considered a particular partnership to be a partnership "confined to a single
transaction."
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"The particular partnership is that which relates to cer-
tain specified things, to their use, or to the benefit to be de-
rived from the same. 17 4
*"The contract by which several persons associate together
either for a specified undertaking or for the exercise of some
trade or profession is likewise a particular partnership."175
The French subdivide particular or true partnerships into civil
partnerships and commercial partnerships. 1'76 The definition of the
particular partnership incorporated into the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1808 was practically identical with the French definition,1 7
but it was beclouded by subsequent articles of that code.'7 8
The redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, when they
drafted the counterparts of the articles numbered 2826 and 2835
in the present Louisiana code, departed from the French defini-
tions. Their reason for incorporating those articles into the Code
of 1825 is not clear. Obviously those articles were inconsistent
with other provisions of that code. The redactors probably did not
understand clearly the differences between the various partner-
ship concepts; perhaps they were confused by the imprecise defi-
nitions contained in the Code of 1808. At any rate, about 1825,
many members of the legal profession in Louisiana seem to have
had conceptions of the characteristics of the "particular" partner-
ship which did not accord with the traditional civil law defini-
tion.17 9
In discussing the various kinds of Louisiana partnerships,
this paper returns to the original civil law classifications. Article
2835 and the last clause of Article 2826 are disregarded since
those provisions are meaningless and incomprehensible when
read in connection with other articles of the code. The result is
that in this paper Louisiana partnerships are divided first into
universal partnerships and particular partnerships. The latter, or
true partnerships, in turn are classified "as to their object" into
ordinary partnerships and commercial partnerships. This classi-
fication corresponds to the French classification into civil and
commercial partnerships. "Ordinary"'8 0 rather than "particular"
174. Translation, Art. 1841, French Civil Code.
175. Translation, Art. 1842, French Civil Code.
176. 23 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Wahl, Trait6 Th~orique et Pratique de
Droit Civil, de la Socit6, du Pr6t, du Depot (3 ed. 1907) 72, no 104; Guillouard,
Trait6 du Contrat de Socift6 (1892) 153, no 89.
177. Arts. 12, 13, p. 390, La. Civil Code of 1808.
178. Arts. 14, 15, p. 390, La. Civil Code of 1808.
179. See cases cited note 181, infra.
180. Not to be confused with the classification "ordinary" that some
Anglo-American writers make in partnerships. See Gilmore, Handbook on
the Law of Partnership (1911) 103-104, §§ 31, 32.
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is used to designate the Louisiana non-commercial partnership
because (1) the former term historically is the sounder designa-
tion in view of the concepts existing in French law when the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 was adopted; (2) "particular" is
used to distinguish the true partnership from the universal kart-
nership; (3) "ordinary" conforms to the terminology now used
by Louisiana lawyers. Although the courts in some early cases
used "particular" to refer to a non-commercial partnership,'
"ordinary" is the term almost invariably employed at the present
time.8 2
The universal partnership can be dismissed with brief men-
tion. It was never popular in Louisiana. 83 Only one reported
case in Louisiana legal history has been found in which a uni-
versal partnership was held to have been created. 8 4 The articles
of the Civil Code on the universal partnership' 5 apparently were
incorporated into the code through inadvertence. The universal
partnership had disappeared from French law at the time the
Code Napoleon was prepared, but the redactors provided for the
universal partnership thinking that it might regain its popular-
ity.'8 6 Little use has been made in France of the universal part-
nership since the adoption of the Code Napoleon.8 7 The redactors
of the Louisiana Civil Codes of 1808 and 1825, apparently with
no inquiry into the utility of the universal partnership, brought
that institution into Louisiana law. This archaic device, however,
does not serve to differentiate Louisiana law from Anglo-Ameri-
can law. Strangely enough, a universal partnership practically
identical with the device described in the Louisiana Civil Code
181. Slocum v. Sibley, 5 Mart.(O.S.) 682, 684 (1818); Phillips v. Paxton,
3 Mart.(N.S.) 39, 40 (1824); Derbigny v. Modelli, 15 La. 496, 498-499 (1840);
Marsh v. Marsh, 9 Rob. 45, 47 (La. 1844).
182. The court in In re Liquidation of Mitchell-Borne Const. Co., 145 La.
379, 382, 82 So. 377, 378 (1919), perhaps somewhat in doubt as to the distinc-
tions between the various types of partnerships, referred to the firm there
under consideration as "an ordinary and particular partnership." See also
Buard v. Lem~e, 12 Rob. 243, 247 (1845).
183. Saunders, Lectures on the Civil Code of Louisiana (ed. by Bonomo,
1925) 497, states: "No universal partnership ever existed under the sun, and
I do not think that anyone who had sense or intelligence would have defined
such an arrangement."
184. Reynaud's Heirs v. Peytavin's Executors, 13 La. 121 (1839). For cases
in which such a relation was alleged to exist but was not found by the court,
see Murrell v. Murrell, 33 La. Ann. 1233 (1881); Lagarde v. Dabon, 155 La. 25,
98 So. 744 (1924); Succession of Arnold, 170 La. 744, 129 So. 150 (1930); Gray
v. Carter, 176 So. 885 (La. App. 1937).
185. Arts. 2829-2834, La. Civil Code of 1870.
186. The indecision of the redactors of the Code Napoleon on whether to
prohibit partnerships of the universal type Is discussed in Guillouard, Trait6
du Contrat de Soci~t6 (1892) 169-171, no 102.
187. See 11 Huc, Commentaire Th~orique & Pratique du Code Civil (1898)
56, n° 44.
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theoretically is possible in Anglo-American jurisdictions. 88 In
fact, a few associations have been created in Anglo-American
jurisdictions which seem to coincide with the Louisiana definition
of the universal partnership. 8 9
The classification of Louisiana partnerships into commercial
and ordinary firms corresponds in general to the distinction drawn
in some Anglo-American jurisdictions between trading or com-
mercial partnerships and non-trading or non-commercial partner-
ships.190 The terms "trading" and "non-trading" at one time were
used frequently by Anglo-American courts, and even today are
used occasionally in some jurisdictions, to distinguish partner-
ships engaged in frequent purchasing for the purpose of sale in
the same or improved form from those not so engaged. 191 As in
Anglo-American jurisdictions, in Louisiana the nature of the
business conducted determines whether a partnership is com-
mercial.19 2 Usually firms which are classified as trading in Anglo-
American jurisdictions, namely, those which buy and sell as a
business,193 also would be deemed commercial in Louisiana.
9 4
188. Gilmore, Handbook on the Law of Partnership (1911) 104, § 32. "We
can see no reason why parties should not be competent to form a universal
partnership. There is nothing impractical in it, nor against morality or public
policy." Gray v. Palmer, 9 Cal. 616, 640 (1858).
189. See Goesele v. Bimeler, 14 How. 589 (U. S. 1852); Lyman v. Lyman, 15
Fed. Cas. 1147, No. 8628 (C. C. Vt. 1829).
190. Occasionally referred to as partnerships of employment and occupa-
tion. See Lee v. First Nat. Bank of Ft. Scott, 45 Kan. 8, 25 Pac. 196 (1890).
191. Pease v. Cole, 53 Conn. 53, 22 Atl. 681 (1885); Marsh, Merwin & Lem-
mon v. Wheeler, 77 Conn. 449, 59 At. 410 (1904); Reid v. Linder, 77 Mont.
406, 251 Pac. 157 (1926).
192. American Nat. Bank v. Reclamation Oil Producing Ass'n, 156 La.
652, 101 So. 10 (1924); Southern Coal Co. v Sundbery & Winkler, 158 La. 386, 104
So. 124 (1925). "It is the dealings and business of a partnership which make
it a commercial one, not the form of the obligations they may contract."
McGehee v. McCord, 14 La. 362, 365 (1840). For discussions of the differences
between the French civil and commercial partnerships, see 23 Baudry-
Lacantinerie et Wahl, Trait6 Th6orique et Pratique de Droit Civil, de la
Socit6, du Pr6t, du D6pot (3 ed. 1907) 72-86, nos 104-124; Guillouard, Trait6
du Contrat de Soci~t6 (2 ed. 1892) 157, no 91. "Scientifiquement le caractdre
civil commercial d'une socittd se ddtermine par la nature des opdrations de
la socidtd .... " 11 Huc, Commentaire Th6orique & Pratique du Code Civil
(1898) 58, n 46.
193. Marsh, Merwin & Lemmon v. Wheeler, 77 Conn. 449, 59 Atl. 410
(1904); Lee v. First Nat. Bank of Ft. Scott, 45 Ran. 8, 25 Pac. 196 (1890);
First Nat. Bank v. Farson, 226 N.Y. 218, 123 N.E. 490 (1919).
194. The following cases illustrate the types of businesses which, when
conducted by partnerships, result in commercial firms: Norris' Heirs v.
Ogden's Ex's, 11 Mart.(O.S.) 455 (La. 1822) (firm conducting business as iron
mongers); Hubbell v. Read, .14 La. 243 (1840) (firm doing business as "wood
merchants, and running drays for hire"); English v. Wall, 12 Rob. 132 (La.
1845) (dealers in exchange); Nachtrib v. Prague and Sherman, 6 La. Ann.
759 (1851) (firm engaged in running sawmill, buying timber, and manufactur-
ing lumber out for sale); Coward v. Pulley, 11 La. Ann. 1 (1856) (business
of manufacturing carriages); Copley v. John Lawhead & Co., 11 La. Ann. 615
(1856) (enterprise "to run steam-sawmill, make and sell timber, and to carry
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Conversely, those partnerships which would be classified as non-
trading in Anglo-American jurisdictions, such as firms engaged
in the practice of law, in engineering, or in carpentry, would be
deemed ordinary partnerships in Louisiana. 19 5
By the last paragraph of Article 2825 of the Louisiana Civil
Code partnerships "carrying personal property or passengers for
hire" are designated as commercial. Prior to amendment by Act
150 of 1930, the paragraph listed as commercial partnerships
those formed "3. For carrying personal property for hire, in ships
or other vessels." The Louisiana courts uniformly construed the
original provision to exclude from the category of commercial
partnership those firms engaged in carrying personal property
for hire other than in ships or other vessels.19 The amended
version leaves no doubt that partnerships engaged in transporta-
on the lumber business generally"); Grant v. Hyatt, 22 La. Ann. 411 (1870)(firm formed to buy rough lumber, plane and dress it, and sell it in dressed
state); Williams v. Hewitt,' 47 La. Ann. 1076, 17 So. 496 (1896) (bank); W. B.
Thompson & Co. v. Gosserand, 131 La. 1056, 60 So. 682 (1913) (cotton gin);
Brown v. Bank of Minden, 167 La. 421, 119 So. 413 (1929) (firm organized to
purchase timber, operate sawmill, sell lumber, and carry on incidental busi-
ness); Neson v. Watts, 4 La. App. 615 (1926) (restaurant); Blanchard v.
Patterson, 9 La. App. 706, 119 So. 902 (1929) (restaurant); Futch v. Addison,
12 La. App. 535, 126 So. 590 (1930) (firm formed "to buy standing timber, to
cut It into saw logs, and to sell and deliver the logs"); Roane v. Bourg, 177
So. 373 (La. App. 1937) (firm buying raw sugar, refining it, and selling the
refined product). A single joint purchase of personal property to resell at a
profit constitutes the parties commercial partners quoad that transaction.
Purdy v. Hood, 5 Mart.(N.S.) 626 (La. 1827); Robertson v. De Lizardi, 4 Rob.
300 (La. 1843). See also Hagan v. Fowler, 6 La. 311, 314 (1834).
195. The following are Illustrations of businesses which when operated
by a partnership create ordinary partnerships: McGehee v. McCord, 14 La.
362 (1840) (firm constructing a railroad); Heath v. Howell & Johnson, 15 La.
138 (1840) (firm of carpenters); McCauley v. Barnes, 15 La. 427 (1840) (firm
to operate cotton compress); Brown v. Hughes, 2 La. Ann. 623 (1847) (firm
of ship carpenters); Lapeyre v. Murphy, 6 La. Ann. 794 (1851) (firm of carpen-
ters); Hermanos v. Duvigneaud & Pauvert, 10 La. Ann. 114 (1855) (firm sell-
ing patented process of clarifying sugar); Robert Moores & Co. v. Bates,
Benson & Co., 13 La. Ann. 40 (1858) (firm to build railroads); Dyer & Steven-
son v. Drew, 14 La. Ann. 657 (1859) (law firm); Hamilton v. Hodges, 30 La.
Ann. 1290 (1878) (planting partnership); Benedict v. Thompson & Torjusen,
33 La. Ann. 196 (1881) (firm of stevedores); Rivers v. City of New Orleans,
42 La. Ann. 1196, 8 So. 484 (1890) (firm to operate hotel); Jamison v. Charles
F. Cullom & Co., 110 La. 781, 34 So. 775 (1903) (firm to build drainage canals);
In re Liquidation of Mitchell-Borne Const. Co., 145 La. 379, 82 So. 377 (1919)
(construction firm); National Oil Works v. Korn Bros., 164 La. 800, 114 So.
659 (1927) (firm of plumbers); Robertson v. Cambon, 176 La. 753, 146 So.
738 (1933) (real estate firm); Posey v.. Fargo, 187 La. 122, 174 So. 175 (1937)(firm to drill an oil well); Ahrens & Ott Mfg. Co. v. Ideal Plumbing Co., 12
Orl. App. 33 (1914) (firm of plumbers); Phillips v. Ray, 1 La. App. 584 (1925)
(firm to drill oil well); White v. Stratton, 8 La. App. 342 (1928) (firm of
lawyers); Independence Indemnity Co. v. Carmical & Woodring, 13 La. App.
64, 127 So. 10 (1930) (firm to furnish trucks and drivers to contractors).
196. G. P. Eberle & Co. v. Schmidt Osborne Storage & Transfer Co., 9 La.
App. 378, .119 So. 442 (1928). The term "vessel" was limited to "any structure
which is made to float upon the water, for purposes of commerce or war,
whether impelled by wind, steam or oars." John Chaffe & Bro. v. Ludeling,
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tion by rail or by motor vehicle are commercial partnerships. 19 7
Whether partnerships engaged in transportation would be classed
as trading firms in Anglo-American law is doubtful. A definitive
answer does not seem to have been given by Anglo-American
courts.198
Anglo-American courts often have difficulty in determining
whether a certain partnership is a trading or a non-trading firm;
Louisiana courts also frequently have trouble classifying a part-
nership as commercial or ordinary. Quite often the characteristics
of a partnership are heterogeneous. The Louisiana courts have not
resorted to either French' 99 or Anglo-American authorities for
assistance in classifying partnerships with "mixed objects." Yet
the jurisprudence which the Louisiana courts have developed in-
dependently is similar in large part to Anglo-American jurispru-
dence.
The Louisiana courts have held that an ordinary partnership
does not become a commercial firm by engaging in incidental and
comparatively unimportant and infrequent commercial acts.2 °°
Thus, plumbers are not commercial partners because in connec-
tion with their business they furnish plumbing supplies, 201 nor
27 La. Ann. 607, 611 (1875). Thus, common carriers by rail were not com-
mercial partners. John Chaffe & Bro. v. Ludeling, supra. Likewise, a partner-
ship engaged in the transfer and storage of movable property for hire by
automobile trucks was not a commercial one. G. P. Eberle & Co. i. Schmidt
Osborne Storage & Transfer Co., supra; Independence Indemnity Co. v. Car-
mical & Woodring, 13 La. App. 64, 127 So. 10 (1930). The courts eventually
recognized that policy dictated that carriers by rail and automobile be held
to the responsibility of commercial partners but concluded that a contrary
interpretation of Article 2824 had become a rule of property which could not
be disturbed without legislative action. G. P. Eberle & Co. v. Schmidt Osborne
Storage & Transfer Co., supra. The legislature acted in 1930.
197. A similar result was reached by French courts without legislative
action. Cass., 8 nov. 1892, D.93.1.78; Cass., 3 f~v. 1902, S.1902.1.72. See also
Lyon, 4 juill. 1890, S.92.2.275 (partnership furnishing utilities).
198. See Guthiel v. Gilmer, 23 Utah 84, 63 Pac. 817 (1901) (firm engaged
primarily in running stages and transporting mails, express matter, and
passengers, held non-trading partnership); Jacobson v. Lamb, 267 Pac. 114,
115-116 (Cal. App. 1928) ("Under modern conditions it would seem that the
business of hauling freight for hire is a commercial business.")
199. For an excellent discussion of the theories prevailing in France for
determining the civil or commercial character of partnerships with "mixed
objects," see 1 Pic, Tralt6 Gdndral Thdorique et Pratique de Droit Commer-
cial, des Soci~tds Commerciales (2 ed. 1925) 165-167, n 0 138.
200. Drew v. Bank of Monroe, 125 La. 673, 51 So. 683 (1910); Baldwin v.
Wachstetter, 7 Orl. App. 116 (1910); Ahrens & Ott Mfg. Co. v. Ideal Plumbing
Co., 12 Orl. App. 33 (1914); Resor v. Capelle, 140 So. 699 (La. App. 1932). Cf.
Mahoney v. Martin, 35 La. Ann. 29, 32 (1883), where the court indicated that
the carrying of a single passenger by a steamboat would render the owners
commercial partners.
201. Ahrens & Ott Mfg. Co. v. Ideal Plumbing Co., 12 Orl. App. 33 (1914).
In accord: Huey v. Fish, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 455, 40 S.W. 29 (1897). Contra:
Marsh, Merwin & Lemmon, 77 Conn. 449, 59 Atl. 410 (1904).
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are beauty parlor operators commercial partners because of the
incidental sale of toilet articles.20 2 The Louisiana Supreme Court
has suggested, however, that the rules governing commercial
partnerships may be applied to the particular legal relations
created by the commercial transactions. 20 3
Where the commercial business transacted by the firm is
not merely incidental to non-commercial activities but forms a
substantial portion of its total business, the Louisiana courts will
treat the members as commercial partners with respect to all
the firm's operations unless the commercial transactions are seg-
regated from the non-commercial transactions. 20 4 Anglo-American
courts seem to reach practically the same results when they lay
down the rule that a firm can be a trading partnership even
though buying and selling is not the sole or even the most char-
acteristic feature of the firm business. 205 For example, in W. M.
Barnett Bank v. Chiatovick2 6 members of a firm operating a
ranch and running a store located on the ranch were held liable
on a note executed by a co-partner. The court felt that, even
though part of the firm business was non-commercial, the part-
ners were clothed with all the apparent powers of trading part-
ners since the mercantile business was commingled with the
ranching.
The distinction between trading and non-trading partner-
ships has been used in Anglo-American law in determining the
extent of a partner's power to affect the legal relations of his
co-partners. Courts which make the distinction find by implica-
202. Resor v. Capelle, 140 So. 699 (La. App. 1932). In Flower v. Williams,
1 La. 22, 27 (1830), the following language was used: "It is certainly true
that the sale of medicines to the vendor's patients, and an incidental sale to
a neighbor, are not acts which can be viewed as commercial transactions.
An innkeeper sells wine to his lodgers, without thereby becoming a mer-
chant . . . and the casual sale of a bottle to a neighbor, would not make it
SO.,,
The fact that the plaintiff alleges and defendant admits in his answer
that a certain firm is a commercial partnership does not establish it as such
where the evidence shows that it is actually an ordinary partnership. J. T.
Gibbons v. S. & B. Stable, 144 So. 641 (La. App. 1932). Query as to whether
a firm making carriages or other articles to order would be a commercial
firm. See Coward v. Pulley, 11 La. Ann. 1, 2 (1856).
203. "One transaction of a commercial character may perhaps be con-
sidered the act of a commercial partnership quoad the transaction; but it
does not have the effect of changing an ordinary partnership into a com-
mercial partnership." Bank of Monroe v. E. C. Drew Inv. Co., 128 La. 1028,
1040, 53 So. 129, 133 (1910). Compare authorities cited note 243, infra.
204. Southern Coal Co. v. Sundbery & Winkler, 158 La. 386, 104 So. 124
(1925); First Nat. Bank v. Mayer, 129 La. 981, 57 So. 308 (1912); Roane v.
Bourg, 177 So. 373 (La. App. 1937).
205. Marsh, Merwin & Lemmon v. Wheeler, 77 Conn. 449, 59 At. 410 (1904).
206. 48 Nev. 319, 232 Pac. 206 (1925).
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cation a greater power in a member of a trading firm than in a
member of a non-trading firm. They lay down a rule that a part-
ner in a trading firm has an implied power to bind the firm and
his co-partners by all acts within the scope of partnership busi-
ness.20 7 On the other hand, they state that a presumption exists
that a non-trading partner does not have power to bind his co-
partner and that a plaintiff, to recover against the other partners
on a contract made by a non-trading partner, must affirmatively
show (1) that authority was conferred by the articles of partner-
ship, (2) that authority was conferred specially by the other part-
ners, or (3) that authority of the kind exercised is usually or cus-
tomarily incident to other partnerships of like nature. 20 Actually
the effect of the rules seems to be that in trading partnerships
the extent of a partner's power to bind the firm is a question of
law while the extent of a partner's power in a non-trading firm
is a question of fact.20 9
The Louisiana courts use the commercial and ordinary clas-
sifications in determining the extent of a partner's authority
much as the Anglo-American courts use the trading and non-
trading categories. The power of a commercial partner is not
discussed in the Louisiana Civil Code, but the Louisiana juris-
prudence has held that the acts of a commercial partner in the
course of partnership business bind the firm.210 Thus a commer-
cial partner can make or endorse negotiable paper for the part-
nership.2 11 On the other hand, power in an ordinary partner to
bind his co-partners is not implied from the fact of partnership.21 2
The Civil Code expressly states that an ordinary partner purport-
ing to act on behalf of the firm cannot bind his partners, "unless
they have given him power so to do, either specifically or by the
articles of partnership. '213 However, members of an ordinary
partnership in Louisiana, like members of a non-trading firm
207. Hyland v. City Garbage & Contracting Co., 9 Wash.(2d) 163, 114 P.
(2d) 153 (1941); Rue v. Merrill, 42 Wyo. 497, 297 Pac. 375 (1931).
208. Woodruff v. Scaife, 83 Ala. 152, 3 So. 311 (1887); Hyland v. City
Garbage & Contracting Co., 9 Wash.(2d) 163, 114 P.(2d) 153 (1941).
209. See Judge v. Braswell, 13 Bush. 69, 26 Am. Rep. 185 (Ky. 1877).
210. Schofield v. Cane, Ousley & Bennett, Man. Unrep. Cas. 160 (1877-
1880). Cf. W. B. Thompson & Co. v. Gosserand, 131 La. 1056, 60 So. 682 (1913).
211. Cottam v. George H. Smith & Co., 27 La- Ann. 128 (1875); Cedar
Rapids Nat. Bank v. Delanenville, 6 Orl. App. 108 (1909); Planters Bank &
Trust Co. v. Guilbeau, 151 So. 264 (La. App. 1933).
212. See Dumartrait v. Gay, 1 Rob. 62, 64 (La. 1841).
213. Art. 2872, La. Civil Code of 1870; Benedict v. Thompson & Torjusen,
33 La. Ann. 196 (1881); Jamison v. Charles F. Cullom & Co., 110 La. 781, 34
So. 775 (1903).
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elsewhere, can ratify a partner's unauthorized act 214 or estop
themselves from denying that they authorized it.215
The distinction made between trading and non-trading part-
nerships in Anglo-American jurisdictions is of little value and
serves as a snare for the unwary. Naturally, a partner in a firm
conducting commercial transactions ordinarily will have greater
authority to bind his co-partners than will a partner in a non-
trading firm. Yet a partner's authority should depend on an in-
terpretation of the contract of partnership. Persons who enter
into a partnership should be held, in the absence of manifesta-
tions to the contrary, to have authorized each other to commit
acts which are usual and proper in other firms engaged in the
same kind of business. Likewise, a partner's apparent authority
should be measured by the authority usually conferred on part-
ners in similar firms in that locality. The business of many firms
which do not buy and sell nevertheless comprehends the employ-
ment of capital and credit and brings the partners into frequent
contact with the commercial world. Even though such partner-
ships technically are classified as non-trading, to hold that a
partner in such a firm is not authorized to bind his firm, on nego-
tiable paper for instance, ordinarily violates the intentions of the
partners.
Many Anglo-American jurisdictions expressly have aban-
doned the classification of partnerships into trading and non-
trading firms.216 The Uniform Partnership Act does not mention
the distinction. Today most Anglo-American courts in determin-
ing the extent of a partner's authority, regardless of whether he
is a member of a firm which buys and sells, look to the limits
commonly and usually fixed in similar businesses at that time
and place and to the acts which are reasonably necessary to con-
duct the business. The Uniform Partnership Act 217 provides that
the partnership is bound by each partner's act, including the ex-
ecution in the partnership name of any instrument, for carrying
on apparently in the usual way the business of the partnership.
There are no indications that Louisiana courts similarly will
214. See Stewart v. Caldwell & Hickey, 9 La. Ann. 419, 422 (1854).
215. See Jamison v. Charles F. Cullom & Co., 110 La. 781, 790, 34 So. 775,
779 (1903). Where the co-partners in an ordinary partnership deny that they
are liable for a contract made by one of them the creditor who seeks to hold
them has the burden of proving that either the defendant whom he seeks to
hold authorized the contract, has benefited by it, or by his conduct has es-
topped himself. Hamilton v. Hodges, 30 La. Ann. 1290 (1878); Jamison v.
Charles F. Cullom & Co., supra.
216. See, for instance, Haskins v. Throne, 101 Ga. 126, 28 S.E. 611 (1897);
Jacobson v. Lamb, 267 Pac. 114 (Cal. App. 1928).
217. U.P.A. § 9.
[VOL. IX
1949] LOUISIANA LAW PARTNERSHIP 483
abandon the distinction between commercial and ordinary part-
nerships. In the last fifty years, the holdings in numerous Lou-
isiana cases have been based on that distinction. Louisiana courts
are not free to disregard partnership categories set forth in the
Civil Code.
Louisiana law grounds other rules, some of which have no
counterparts in Anglo-American law, on the dictinction between
commercial and ordinary partnerships. The most important is
that commercial partners are liable in solido (roughly equiva-
lent to "jointly and severally" of Anglo-American law) for firm
obligations, 218 while an ordinary partner is liable only for his
"virile share, '219 that is, a share calculated "in proportion to the
number of partners, without any attention to the proportion of
the stock or profits each is entitled to."'220 The solidary liability
of commercial partners extends to firm torts, 221 and the liability
of the members of an ordinary partnership is pro parte virili
rather than in solido whether the firm's obligation is based on
tort222 or grounded in contract. A person recovering against an
ordinary partnership is entitled to judgment against the firm for
the amoint proved and against each individual partner of the
firm for his "virile share" of that amount.
223
218. Art. 2872, La. Civil Code of 1870; English v. Wall, 12 Rob. 132 (La.
1845).
The nature of the liability of commercial partners for rent due on real
estate at one time was subject to uncertainty. Early decisions held commer-
cial partners liable in solido for rentals due on buildings. Perrett v. Dupr6,
3 Rob. 52 (La. 1842); Penn v. Kearny, Blois & Co., 21 La. Ann. 21 (1869). A
later case, without citing the earlier decisions, held that since a commercial
firm cannot own real estate, the lease of such property in the firm name
creates a joint obligation rather than an obligation in solido. Hollingsworth
v. Atkins, 46 La. Ann. 515, 15 So. 77 (1894). Finally, the Louisiana Supreme
Court reverted to its original position and held that commercial partners
are bound in solido on a contract to lease a business site even though a
commercial firm as such cannot acquire the ownership of realty. Shreveport
Ice & Brewing Co. v. Mandel Bros., 128 La. 314, 54 So. 831 (1911).
219. Buard v. Lem~e, 12 Rob. 243 (La. 1845); In re Liquidation of Mitchell-
Borne Const. Co., 145 La. 379, 82 So. 377 (1919); G. P. Eberle & Co. v. Schmidt
Osborne Storage & Transfer Co., 9 La. App. 378, 119 So. 442 (1928).
220. Art. 2873, La. Civil Code of 1870; Young v. Reed, 192 So. 780 (La.
'App. 1939). But see Resor v. Capelle, 140 So. 699 (La. App. 1932).
221. Birdsall v. Bemiss, 2 La. Ann. 449 (1847) (conversion); Futch v.
Addison, 12 La. App. 535, 126 So. 590 (1930) (negligence). Cf. Baldy v. Brack-
enridge, 39 La. Ann. 660, 2 So. 410 (1887) (false representations).
222. Independence Indemnity Co. v. Carmical & Woodring, 13 La. App.
64, 127 So. 10 (1930); Haddad v. Endom's Transfer & Storage Garage, 150 So.
870 (La. App. 1933). In Hyams & Jonas v. Rogers, 24 La. Ann. 230 (1872), the
court, relying almost entirely on French authority, held that an ordinary
partner who did not actually join in the act of employing an attorney engaged
by another partner for the firm was liable only "jointly" and not in solido
for the services of said attorney. ("Jointly" is used by Louisiana courts to
indicate that each party is liable for his virile share, not as an equivalent to
"jointly" as used in Anglo-American partnership cases.)
223. National Oil Works v. Korn Bros., 164 La. 800, 114 So. 659 (1927).
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Since each partner in an ordinary firm is liable only for a
"virile share," he may act for himself, and his acts do not benefit
or prejudice his co-partners. 224 Thus he may obtain discharge
from his obligations by paying his share, and his discharge does
not result in the discharge of the other partners. 22 5 Similarly,
the acts of an ordinary partner or a suit brought against such a
partner does not interrupt prescription as to his co-partners.226
Anglo-American law, of course, differs from Louisiana law in
that it does not distinguish between kinds of partnerships in im-
posing liability on partners for firm obligations. At common law
a joint obligation of the partners resulted from partnership con-
tracts, whether the partnership was a trading or a non-trading
firm.227 That rule was incorporated into the Uniform Partner-
ship Act.228 On the other hand, the rule is uniformly applied in
Anglo-American jurisdictions that the liability of partners for
torts committed within the scope of firm business is joint and
several. 229 By statute many states also have imposed joint and
several liability on partners for firm contractual obligations.2 30
An analysis of the Louisiana and Anglo-American rules shows
the following: (1) Members of a commercial partnership in Lou-
isiana are liable in solido (jointly and severally) on firm con-
tracts; members of a trading partnership in most Anglo-American
jurisdictions are liable jointly on such obligations but in some
jurisdictions, where the rule has been changed by statute, they
are liable jointly and severally. (2) Members of a commercial
partnership in Louisiana are liable in solido on obligations aris-
ing out of firm torts, and members of a trading partnership in
Anglo-American jurisdictions are liable jointly and severally on
such obligations. (3) Members of an ordinary partnership in
224. Buard v. Lem&e, 12 Rob. 243 (La. 1845).
225. Drew v. Bank of Monroe, 125 La. 673, 51 So. 683 (1910).
226. Buard v. Lem~e, 12 Rob. 243 (La. 1845). Even though an ordinary
partner is liable only for his "virile share" of firm debts, apparently he can-
not recover the excess paid if he believes that he is liable for the entire debt
and pays the whole amount. Schmidt v. Foucher, 38 La. Ann. 93 (1886). Cf.
Bennett v. Allison, 2 La. 419 (1831). The members of an ordinary partner-
ship may stipulate for a solidary obligation. Payne v. James, 36 La. Ann. 476
(1884). Ordinary partners can bind themselves by special contractual stipu-
lation as they see fit; no reason exists why such partners should not bind
themselves in solido if they choose. Gantt v. Eaton & Barstow, 25 La. Ann.
507 (1873).
227. Gilmore, Handbook on the Law of Partnership (1911) 217-226, §§
69-71; Mechem, Elements of the Law of Partnership (2 ed. 1920) 272-273, §§
307-308.
228. U.P.A. § 15.
229. U.P.A. §§ 13-15; Howe v. Shaw, 56 Me. 291 (1868); Roberts v. Johnson,
58 N.Y. 613 (1874).
230. Mechem, op. cit. supra note 227, at 273, § 308.
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Louisiana are liable each for his virile share on firm contractual
obligations, while members of a non-trading firm are liable joint-
ly, or jointly and severally where that liability has been imposed
by statute. (4) Members of an ordinary partnership are liable
each for his virile share on firm torts, while members of trading
partnerships in Anglo-American jurisdictions are liable jointly
and severally.
The Louisiana rule limiting the liability of partners in an
ordinary firm is subject to considerable criticism. Since the share
of the liability is calculated in proportion to the total number
of partners without regard to his contributions to the common
stock or his share in the profits, a person who wishes to engage
in a speculative enterprise theoretically can shield himself from
substantial risk by associating with himself financially irrespon-
sible "partners" entitled to infinitesimal shares in the profits. Per-
haps that possibility influenced the Orleans Court of Appeal in
Resor v. Capelle231 to ignore Article 2873232 and prior Louisiana
jurisprudence and to impose liability in proportion to each part-
ner's "interest" in the firm. Presumably by "interest" the court
meant the proportion of the profits to which a partner is entitled,
but conceivably it meant the proportion of the common stock
which a partner contributed. Resor v. Capelle, however, stands
alone; little likelihood exists that Louisiana courts will follow
the rule established in that case.
Louisiana law possibly would be improved by modifying the
ordinary partner's liability (1) to impose on him liability to third
parties for firm obligations in proportion to the number of part-
ners or in proportion to his participation in the profits, whichever
is greater, and (2) to hold him liable to his co-partners for firm
losses in proportion to his participation in the profits unless the
partnership contract otherwise stipulates. A mere tinkering with
the details of the Louisiana rules on the liability of ordinary
partners, however, will not remove the principal objections. An
examination of the Louisiana cases shows that great risks are
assumed by persons who deal with partnerships. Time and again
a person, on pressing a claim against a large firm, finds that it
is an ordinary partnership, each member of which is liable only
231. 140 So. 699 (La. App. 1932). In that decision the court stated: "There-
fore Mrs. Capelle, having been a partner in an ordinary partnership to the
extent of an undivided two-thirds interest, at the time the claim arose, is
responsible for two-thirds of the debts of the partnership prior to the time
that she became the sole owner." (140 So. 699, 701). Query as to the liability
the court would have imposed on Mrs. Capelle if she had been a partner to
the extent of only a one-third "interest."
232. La. Civil Code of 1870.
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for his virile share, and that no complete remedy is available
since most of the partners are non-resident, their whereabouts
perhaps unknown. 233
Many firms which the Louisiana courts classify as ordinary
partnerships are of considerable size, employ large amounts of
capital and credit, utilize large numbers of employees in their
operations, and come into frequent contact with the commercial
world. Newspaper publishers 234 and large construction firms, 235
for instance, have been held to be ordinary partnerships. More-
over, the Louisiana courts uniformly have held that firms pro-
cessing and selling agricultural products, timber or minerals pro-
duced on or extracted from real estate of the partnership or of
the individual partners are not commercial firms within the
meaning of the Louisiana law.236 Thus in a number of cases per-
sons purchasing an oil refinery to process oil produced from their
own wells have been held ordinary partners.237 These holdings
result from an application of the strict letter of Article 2825: the
partnerships under consideration were not formed "for the pur-
chase of any personal property, and the sale thereof, either in
the same state or changed by manufacture." (Italics supplied.)
On the other hand, when a partnership purchases part of the
products it processes and produces part on its own real estate,
the partners will be deemed commercial partners with respect
to all business unless they segregate the commercial from the
non-commercial transactions. 238
The rule of Louisiana law, set forth in Article 2093,239 that
an obligation in solido is never presumed but must be expressly
stipulated 240 )has fostered a tendency on the part of the Louisiana
233. See Young v. Reed, 192 So. 780, 785 (La. App. 1939).
234. Graham Paper Co. v. Lewis, 159 La. 151, 105 So. 258 (1925).
235. Toelke v. Toelke, 153 La. 697, 96 So. 536 (1923); R. P. Farnsworth &
Co. v. Estrade, Cotton & Fricke, 166 So. 160 (La. App. 1936); Williams Lum-
ber Co. v. Stewart Gast & Bro., 21 So.(2d) 773 (La. App. 1945).
236. American Nat. Bank v. Reclamation Oil Producing Ass'n, 156 La.
652, 101 So. 10 (1924); Miles v. Reclamation Oil Producing Ass'n, 1 La. App.
94 (1924). See also Bank of Monroe v. E. C. Drew Inv. Co., 126 La. 1028, 1040,
53 So. 129, 133 (1910).
237. American Nat. Bank v. Reclamation Oil Producing Ass'n, 156 La.
652, 101 So. 10 (1924); Miles v. Reclamation Oil Producing Ass'n, 1 La. App.
94 (1924).
238. Southern Coal Co. v. Sundbery & Winkler, 158 La. 386, 104 So. 124
(1925); Roane v. Bourg, 177 So. 373 (La. App. 1937).
239. La. Civil Code of 1870.
240. Turange v. Wells, 19 La. Ann. 135 (1867); Bank of Commerce v.
Mayer, 42 La. Ann. 1031, 8 So. 260 (1890); Wunsch v. Noel, 177 So. 92, 94 (La.
App. 1937). One of the exceptions within the intendment of the second para-
graph of Article 2093 is the liability of commercial partners. Perez v. Leake,
169 La. 29, 124 So. 135 (1929).
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courts to classify partnerships as ordinary rather than commer-
cial.
Louisiana's law would be much simplified and policy con-
siderations better served by amending the Civil Code to abolish
the differences between rules applicable to commercial partner-
ships and those relating to. ordinary partnerships and to impose
liability in solido on both commercial and ordinary partners for
firm obligations. At the very least, large ordinary partnerships
which come into frequent contact with the commercial world
should be subjected to the rules now applicable to commercial
partnerships.
The Louisiana Civil Code subdivides commercial partnerships
into "general" and "special" commercial partnerships. 241 Appar-
ently, by "general commercial partnership" the redactors of the
code meant to designate a commercial partnership formed to
conduct a business over a considerable period of time, while by
"special commercial partnership" they intended to refer to the
relations created when two or more persons engage in a single
commercial transaction.2 42 The classification between general and
special commercial partnerships seems to be of little or no utility.
The Louisiana courts have tot discussed the distinction in reach-
ing decisions, apparently because the same rules apply to all
commercial partnerships. 43 '
In Anglo-American law partnerships are divided according
to their scope into general partnerships and special partnerships,
a general partnership being one created for the general and more
or less permanent conduct of a business and a special partner-
ship being one created for one transaction.2 44 This classification,
like the one drawn in Louisiana law between general and special
commercial partnerships, does not seem to be advantageous.2 45
The courts in Anglo-American jurisdictions are much more likely
to refer to a partnership contemplating a single transaction as
a "joint adventure" rather than as a special partnership; and
Louisiana courts have adopted the term "joint adventure" from
241. Art. 2827, La. Civil Code of 1870.
242. See Ward v. Brandt, 11 Mart.(O.S.) 331, 404 (1822); Norris' Heirs. v.
Ogden's Ex's, 11 Mart.(O.S.) 455, 459-460 (1822).
243. A single joint purchase by parties of movable property for the pur-
pose of resale at a profit constitutes such parties commercial partners as to
that transaction. Purdy v. Hood, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 626 (La..1827); Robertson v.
De Lizardi, 4 Rob. 300 (La. 1843).
244. Mechem, Elements of the Law of Partnership (2 ed. 1920) 34, § 32.
245. See Gilmore, Handbook on the Law of Partnership (1911) 104, § 32,
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Anglo-American law and in recent years have made frequent
use of it. 246
Another kind of partnership recognized by Louisiana law is
the partnership in commendam, a device which corresponds
closely to the limited partnership in Anglo-American jurisdic-
tions. The Louisiana partnership in commendam, however, un-
questionably was modeled on the French soci6t6 en comman-
dite.247 The commandite partnership long has been a recognized
form of joint enterprise in most civil law jurisdictions. 248 Provi-
sion for it was included in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808.249
The French text of that code referred to the device as scci6t6
en commandite and the English translation as "corporate part-
nership." Detailed provisions on the partnership in commendam
were contained in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825,250
The New York legislature in 1822, fourteen years after Lou-
isiana legislation had recognized the partnership in commendam,
enacted the first limited partnership act to be adopted in an
Anglo-American jurisdiction. The idea for the statute was drawn
from the French legislation on the sociftd en commandite;2 5 1
thus the Louisiana partnership in commendam and the New York
limited partnership are of the same parentage. Other states fol-
lowed the example set by New York and enacted similar statutes.
The provisions of the early limited partnership statutes and
the articles of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 relating to the
partnership in commendam were roughly similar. The early
limited partnership statutes generally provided that a limited
partnership could be formed by one or more general partners and
one or more persons who shall contribute, in actual cash
payments, a specific sum as capital, to the common stock, who
shall be called special partners, and who shall not be liable
for the debts of the partnership, beyond the fund, so con-
tributed by him or them to the capital. '25 2
246. See p. 333, supra. Louisiana cases recognizing the "joint adventure"
concept include Ludeau v. Avoyelles Cotton Co., 164 La. 275, 113 So. 846(1927); Daily States Pub. Co. v. Uhalt, 169 La. 893, 126 So. 228 (1930); Ault &
Wiborg Co. of Canada v. Carson Carbon Co., 181 La. 681, 160 So. 298 (1935);
Lawrason v. Richard, 16 La. App. 434, 129 So. 250 (1930).
247. See Ulman & Co. v. Briggs, Payne & Co., 32 La. Ann. 655, 659 (1880).
248. Lobingier, The Natural History of the Private Artificial Person: A
Comparative Study in Corporate Origins (1938) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 41, 57;
Pothier, A Treatise on the Contract of Partnership (translated by Tudor,
1854) 41-42.
249. Art. 17, pp. 390-391, La. Civil Code of 1808.
250. Arts. 2810-2822, La. Civil Code of 1825.
251. See Commissioners' Note, 8 Uniform Laws Annotated, Uniform
Limited Partnership Act (ed. by Greene, 1922) 2-3.
252. N.Y. Rev. Stats. (1829) vol. I, pt. II, c. 4, tit. 1, § 2.
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Article 2810 of the Civil Code of 1825 defined the partnership in
commendam:
"Partnership in commendam is formed by a contract, by which
one person or partnership agrees to furnish another person
or partnership a certain amount, either in property or money,
to be employed by the person or partnership to whom it is
furnished, in his or their own name or firm, on condition of
receiving a share in the profits, in the proportion determined
by the contract, and of being liable to losses and expenses to
the amount furnished and no more. '253
The principal difference between the two pieces of legislation
was that the contribution of a special partner had to be in cash,
while that of a partner in commendam could be either in cash or
in property.
A condition precedent to the obtaining of limited liability
under the early limited partnership statutes was that the parties
file and publish a certificate setting forth certain enumerated
matters, such as the name of the firm under which such partner-
ship was to be conducted, the general nature of the business in-
tended to be transacted, the names of the partners (distinguish-
ing general partners from special partners), their respective
places of residence, the amount contributed to the common stock
by the special partners, and the respective times at which the
partnership was to commence and terminate.2 . 4 The Louisiana
Civil Code of 1825 provided that, if the partner in commendam
was to avoid being treated as a general partner, the contract of
partnership had to be in writing, 55 signed by the parties in the
presence of at least one witness,2 6 and contain the following
stipulations: 25 7 (1) the amount furnished by the partner in com-
mendam or the amount he had agreed to furnish; (2) a state-
ment whether the contribution had been received; and, if so,
whether in goods, money or "however otherwise"; and, if not, a
stipulation by the partner in commendam undertaking to pay it;
(3) the proportion of the profits the partner in commendam was
to receive 258 and the proportion of the expenses and losses he was
253. Compare the definitions in 1 Pic, Trait6 G~n~ral Th6orique et Pra-
tique de Droit Commercial, des Soci6t6s Commerciales (2 ed. 1925) 462-463,
n
0 359; Pothier, loc. cit. supra note 248; Schuster, The Principles of German
Civil Law (1907) 55-56. The French Civil Code does not contain an article
which corresponds to Article 2839. But see Art. 23, French Commercial Code.
254. N.Y. Rev. Stats. (1829) vol. I, pt. II, c. 4, tit. 1, § 4.
255. Art. 2816, La. Civil Code of 1825.
256. Art. 2817, La. Civil Code of 1825.
257. Ibid.
258. It "is not necessary that the benefit which the partner expects to
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to bear. The Civil Code further provided that the contract had
to be recorded "in full"2 59 in the parish where the principal busi-
ness of the firm was conducted and, if the firm was a commercial
one, in every parish in which the firm maintained an establish-
ment.2
60
Both the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825261 and the early lim-
ited partnership acts 26 2 provided that the business of the part-
nership was to be conducted in the name of the general partners
only and without the addition of the word "company." Both
statutes also prohibited the special partners from participating
in the conduct of firm business; 26 3 they indicated that if these
prohibitions were disregarded the special partners would be
treated as general partners.
When the limited partnership acts were first subjected to
judicial scrutiny, most courts adopted extremely technical inter-
pretations.2 4 They required meticulous compliance with the pro-
visions of the acts as a prerequisite to what they considered a
privilege in derogation of common law, namely, limited liabil-
ity.2 16 5 Minor infractions of the provisions, though made in good
faith, subjected the special partners to general liability. The
limited partnership came to be looked on as a trap in Anglo-
American jurisdictions rather than as a usable business device.
Louisiana courts, on the other hand, probably because they were
not subject to the rule that statutes in derogation of common
law must be strictly construed, early adopted a liberal attitude
in interpreting the codal provisions on the partnership in com-
mendam. 266
A few Anglo-American courts about 1860 began to give a
somewhat more liberal interpretation to the limited partnership
statutes. These courts shielded the limited partner from general
liability where the parties had substantially complied with the
derive from the business should be exclusively in the shape of a proportion
of the profits. A party may be unwilling to advance money on such contin-
gencies .. " Ulman & Co. v. Briggs, Payne & Co., 32 La. Ann. 655, 660 (1880).
259. Art. 2816, La. Civil Code of 1825.
260. Arts. 2816-2817, La. Civil Code of 1825. See also Arts. 2818-2819, La.
Civil Code of 1825.
261. Art. 2820, La. Civil Code of 1825.
262. N.Y. Rev. Stats. (1829) vol. I, pt. II, c. 4, tit. 1, § 13.
263. Art. 2820, La. Civil Code of 1825; N.Y. Rev. Stats. (1829) vol. I, pt.
II, o. 4, tit. 1, § 17.
264. Comment (1936) 45 Yale L.J. 895, 896; Note (1923) 71 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 150, 152.
265. For examples of the extremely strict constructions placed on limited
partnership acts, see Note (1923) 2 Wis. L. Rev. 301, 302.
266. Lachomette v. Thomas, 5 Rob. 172 (La. 1843); Slocomb v. De Lizardi,
21 La. Ann. 355, 361, 362 (1869).
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statutory requirements. 267 Nevertheless, businessmen did not feel
that they could with safety resort to the limited partnership de-
vice.
The articles of the Civil Code of 1825 relating to the partner-
ship in commendam were incorporated without material change
into the Civil Code of 1870. The Louisiana courts' liberal construc-
tion of the codal provisions did much to mitigate the risk of the
partner in commendam. The courts in effect restricted the general
liability of partners in commendam to situations expressly stipu-
lated in the code.2 8 Further, the Louisiana Supreme Court, fol-
lowing French law, recognized a privilege in the partner in com-
mendam to purchase property from the firm, sell to it, and lend
money to it,26 9 without subjecting himself to general liability.
Perhaps the most lenient Louisiana decision in shielding a partner
in commendam from general liability was Ulman & Company v.
Briggs, Payne & Company.270 In that case the court held that the
partner in commendam had not taken such an active part in the
affairs of the firm as to subject himself to general liability, al-
though he had consulted at least once with the general partner
and had advised third parties that the firm was "all right. 2 '
The liberal decisions encouraged utilization of the partnership in
commendam by Louisiana businessmen.
In 1916 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form Laws approved a Uniform Limited Partnership Act; it now
has been adopted by the legislatures of at least twenty states. 272
The aim of the Uniform Act was to restore the usefulness of the
limited partnership device by removing the possibility that per-
267. Clapp v. Lacey, 35 Conn. 463 (1868); Singer v. Kelly, 44 Pa. 145
(1863). Cf. Van Riper v. Poppenhausen, 43 N.Y. 68, 73 (1870).
268. "When those requirements are not fulfilled, he may incur the lia-
bilities of a general partner, with this restriction, however, that the re-
sponsibility only attaches in the cases specially mentioned by law, which
occur; when the act is not expressive of a specified limited liability, but
provides for a general liability; when the act has not been recorded at all,
or in such an improper manner that third parties were not bound to know
its registry, as for instance if spread in the wrong book; when the partner
has done or permitted some act to be done, from which it could be inferred
that he was a general partner." Ulman & Co. v. Briggs, Payne & Co., 32 La.
Ann. 655, 661 (1880). See also authorities cited note 266, supra.
269. See R. W. Payne & Co. v. Terrell, 33 La. Ann. 812, 815 (1881). But a
partner in commendam who also is a creditor of the firm does not occupy
a more favorable position than a general partner who is a creditor. For in-
stance, he cannot enforce a pledge on firm property to the prejudice of other
creditors. Sherwood v. Creditors, 42 La. Ann. 103, 7 So. 79 (1890). Cf. U.L.P.A.
§ 13.
270. 32 La. Ann. 655 (1880).
271. 32 La. Ann. 655, 662.
272. Crane, Handbook of the Law of Partnership (1938) 80, § 26. Other
states have retained the older type of limited partnership act. See Ga. Code
(1933) §§ 75.401-75.424; Miss. Code (1942) §§ 5553-5570.
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sons who honestly believe themselves to be special partners
might be held to unlimited liability because of some technical
mistake.27 3 Unlimited liability is not imposed on a special partner
unless the creditor actually has been misled by the special part-
ner's name appearing in the firm name or by a false statement
in the certificate, or unless the special partner, in addition to ex-
ercising his rights and powers as a special partner, has taken
part "in the control of the business. '27 4 The act further provides
that a person who erroneously believes himself to be a special
partner can escape general liability by renouncing his interest
in the profits or income of the business.27 5 Finally, the act stipu-
lates that the rule requiring strict construction of statutes in
derogation of common law is inapplicable to it.276
The Uniform Limited Partnership Act is superior in many
respects to the Louisiana codal provisions on the partnership in
commendam. First, the Louisiana Code subjects the partner in
commendam to unlimited liability if the written contract is not
properly prepared and recorded even though creditors are not
misled.2 7 7 Second, the Civil Code does not contain a provision
which affords protection to persons who erroneously believe that
they are partners in commendam. Third, the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act contains many desirable provisions which have
no counterparts in the Louisiana Code. For instance, the Uniform
Act sets forth in detail the rights, powers, and liabilities of a
general partner,278 describes the relations of limited partners
inter se,279 provides for the withdrawal or reduction of a limited
partner's contribution,280 stipulates that a limited partner's in-
terest is assignable, 28 ' states explicitly the effects of a partner's
retirement, death, or insanity,2 8 2 describes the rights of a limited
partner's creditors, 283 and provides the order in which assets are
to be distributed among creditors, limited partners, and general
partners on dissolution of the firm.28
4
Both the Uniform Act and the provisions of the Louisiana
Civil Code are defective in that they do not state exactly what
273. Note (1923) 71 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 150.
274. U.L.P.A. §§ 5(2), 6, 7.
275. U.L.P.A. § 11.
276. U.L.P.A. § 28.
277. Arts. 2845-2846, La. Civil Code of 1870.
278. U.L.P.A. § 9.
279. U.L.P.A. § 14.
280. U.L.P.A. § 16.
281. U.L.P.A. § 19.
282. U.L.P.A. §§ 20-21.
283. U.L.P.A. § 22.
284. U.L.P.A. § 23.
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participation in firm affairs subjects a limited partner or partner
in commendam to unlimited liability. The Uniform Act indicates
that a limited partner will become liable as a general partner if
"he takes part in the control of the business." 28 5 The term "con-
trol" is not defined.2 8 6 The Louisiana Civil Code provides that "if
the partner in commendam shall take any part in the business
of the partnership" he shall be liable as a general partner.28 7 As
has been noted previously,28 8 the Louisiana Supreme Court has
held that a partner in commendam did not take part in the busi-
ness of the firm within the intendment of the code when he con-
sulted with the general partners on one occasion and advised
third parties that the firm was "all right."
Considerable doubt exists whether either the limited part-
nership or the partnership in commendam is a necessary de-
vice.28 9 Both in Anglo-American jurisdictions and in Louisiana
the courts long ago repudiated the doctrine of Waugh v. Carv-
er.290 Investors now can participate in the profits of a business
without fear of personal liability. A general investor can secure
for himself by contract all the privileges of a limited partner or
partner in commendam; in fact, in some jurisdictions an investor
can participate in the management of an enterprise to a consid-
erably greater extent than a limited partner without becoming
liable as a partner.2 9 1
This section has shown that each class of partnership known
to Louisiana law corresponds to a kind of partnership recognized
in Anglo-American law, that this similarity is attributable not
only to Louisiana's importation of Anglo-American ideas but also
to Anglo-American law's borrowing from civil law sources and
to a natural parallel development in the two systems. It further
has pointed out that several of the Louisiana partnership classi-
fications serve no useful purpose. Finally, this section has noted
several respects in which Louisiana's partnership law has not
kept pace in development with Anglo-American partnership law
and now seems definitely inferior in those respects.
285. U.L.P.A. § 7.
286. See Comment (1936) 45 Yale L.J. 895, 902-904 for possible interpreta-
tions of Section 7 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.
287. Art. 2849, La. Civil Code of 1870.
288. See p. 491, supra.
289. See Crane, Are Limited Partnerships Necessary? (1933) 17 Minn. L.
Rev. 351.
290. See pp. 348, 358, 367, supra.
291. Myers v. St. Louis Structural Steel Co., 333 Mo. 464, 65 S.W.(2d) 931
(1933); Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 158 N.E. 77 (1927).
1949]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSIONS
This paper, it is submitted, establishes that: (1) Louisiana
courts in deciding partnership cases, due to the failure of the
legislature to adopt a commercial code, have been forced to work
with the partnership articles in the Civil Code-articles which
at the time of drafting were not intended to apply to commercial
partnerships and which clearly are inadequate to regulate busi-
ness relations in a modem economy; (2) many of the articles in
the Civil Code which relate to partnership are vague and con-
fusing; (3) Louisiana courts, in filling the hiatuses in the partner-
ship articles of the Civil Code, early began to resort to Anglo-
American authorities with greater frequency than to French
materials and, since the Civil War, seldom have cited French
materials in partnership cases; (4) Louisiana courts, in a great
number of partnership cases, including most of the important,
hard-fought ones, have grounded their decisions on Anglo-Am-
erican authorities, often adopting as a statement of Louisiana
law rules exactly as worded in Anglo-American texts or cases;
(5) Louisiana courts in some instances openly have borrowed
concepts (the "joint adventure," for instance) from Anglo-Am-
erican law; (6) the phases of partnership law which have caused
the most difficulty to Anglo-American courts also have caused
the Louisiana courts considerable trouble, and in solving these
problems the Louisiana courts usually have applied the prin-
ciples popular at that particular time in the other states; (7) even
rules of Louisiana partnership law which are purely civilian in
origin seldom result in underlying practices different from those
which prevail in Anglo-American jurisdictions (often the civil
law rules and Anglo-American rules even in their wording are
quite similar, many rules in both systems having originated in
Roman law; in other instances, though the rules are not stated
in the same terminology, supposed differences are largely verbal
and vanish when the rules are analyzed); and (8) where real and
substantial differences in underlying partnership practices do
exist, the law of the more progressive of the Anglo-American
jurisdictions, though it often leaves much to be desired, generally
is superior to Louisiana law.
This paper, it is believed, shows beyond question that drastic
changes should be made in the Louisiana law of partnership. At
the very least, the inconsistencies in the codal classifications of
partnerships should be removed, provisions on the commercial
partnership should be drafted and incorporated into Louisiana
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law, and codal provisions on the liability of ordinary partners
should be redrafted to impose the same liability on members of
ordinary firms as is now imposed on members of commercial
firms. But changes more fundamental are needed. In drafting
new partnership rules, archaic civilian terminology and concepts
should be abandoned and attention focused on the partnership
law of the more progressive of the Anglo-American jurisdictions.
Perhaps a study of modern French law would be profitable, but
to model new articles of the Louisiana Code on modem French
law would be to invite a recurrence of the same chaotic legal
conditions which now exist. Law cannot long remain static. Since
Louisiana law is cut off from French legal literature, Anglo-Am-
erican ideas inevitably would permeate into the Louisiana juris-
prudence causing confusion and uncertainty. The preparation in
Louisiana of adequate commentaries for a separate system of law
would be impractical because of the limited number of legal
scholars in the state and the small market for Louisiana books.
Duplicating and overlapping concepts again would evolve; a
hybrid terminology would develop. The most satisfactory way
to attack the problems of Louisiana partnership law, and prob-
ably the problems in other fields of Louisiana law, is for Louisi-
ana to abandon civil law, renounce its legal isolationism, and
join the other states in a quest for better, more uniform laws.
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